On the market for “Lemons”: quality provision in markets with asymmetric information
Abstract Akerlof’s “Lemons” paper provides a seminal economic result suggesting that, in markets with asymmetric information where product quality is unobservable by consumers prior to purchase and use, the introduction of a low-quality product will drive its higher quality counterpart(s) out of the...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
2020-12-01
|
| Series: | Humanities & Social Sciences Communications |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-020-00658-w |
| Summary: | Abstract Akerlof’s “Lemons” paper provides a seminal economic result suggesting that, in markets with asymmetric information where product quality is unobservable by consumers prior to purchase and use, the introduction of a low-quality product will drive its higher quality counterpart(s) out of the market. In this paper we identify some empirically relevant cases/conditions under which the introduction of a low-quality product does not drive its higher quality substitutes out of the market but, instead, ends-up coexisting with them. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2662-9992 |