Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective
Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given co...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Sciendo
2015-03-01
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| Series: | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0004 |
| _version_ | 1819118581915320320 |
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| author | Gładziejewski Paweł |
| author_facet | Gładziejewski Paweł |
| author_sort | Gładziejewski Paweł |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-22T05:51:10Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ef9242ca87654ddfbfcc51801c43a510 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0860-150X 2199-6059 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-22T05:51:10Z |
| publishDate | 2015-03-01 |
| publisher | Sciendo |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric |
| spelling | doaj.art-ef9242ca87654ddfbfcc51801c43a5102022-12-21T18:36:52ZengSciendoStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric0860-150X2199-60592015-03-01401639010.1515/slgr-2015-0004slgr-2015-0004Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic PerspectiveGładziejewski Paweł0Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of SciencesDespite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a (truly, genuinely, nontrivially, etc.) representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition.https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0004mechanistic explanationrepresentationalismantirepresentationalismmental representations-representationemulation theorypredictive coding |
| spellingShingle | Gładziejewski Paweł Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric mechanistic explanation representationalism antirepresentationalism mental representation s-representation emulation theory predictive coding |
| title | Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective |
| title_full | Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective |
| title_fullStr | Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective |
| title_full_unstemmed | Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective |
| title_short | Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective |
| title_sort | explaining cognitive phenomena with internal representations a mechanistic perspective |
| topic | mechanistic explanation representationalism antirepresentationalism mental representation s-representation emulation theory predictive coding |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1515/slgr-2015-0004 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gładziejewskipaweł explainingcognitivephenomenawithinternalrepresentationsamechanisticperspective |