Quine and the Problem of Truth
Widespread deflationistic readings of Quine misrepresent his view of disquotation’s significance and the truth predicate’s utility. I demonstrate this by answering a question that philosophers have not directly addressed: how does Quine understand the philosophical problem of truth? A primary thesis...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MULPress
2016-11-01
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| Series: | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| Online Access: | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/2359 |
| _version_ | 1818113984777158656 |
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| author | Joshua Schwartz |
| author_facet | Joshua Schwartz |
| author_sort | Joshua Schwartz |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Widespread deflationistic readings of Quine misrepresent his view of disquotation’s significance and the truth predicate’s utility. I demonstrate this by answering a question that philosophers have not directly addressed: how does Quine understand the philosophical problem of truth? A primary thesis of this paper is that we can answer this question only by working from within Quine’s naturalistic framework. Drawing on neglected texts from Quine's corpus, I defend the view that, for Quine, the problem of truth emerges from the development of science, in particular, from logical theorizing. I show that disquotation itself, from this Quinean point of view, is the problematic phenomenon calling for philosophical reflection. I conclude by arguing that Quine does not envisage the kind of explanatory role for disquotation taken up by contemporary deflationists, and he shows no interest in the task that animates deflationism, namely, to show that concerns with truth’s nature are fundamentally confused. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T03:43:31Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f09bd85be9194a0a8c9c9c29750c5d32 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2159-0303 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T03:43:31Z |
| publishDate | 2016-11-01 |
| publisher | MULPress |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| spelling | doaj.art-f09bd85be9194a0a8c9c9c29750c5d322022-12-22T01:22:05ZengMULPressJournal for the History of Analytical Philosophy2159-03032016-11-0141010.15173/jhap.v4i10.2359Quine and the Problem of TruthJoshua Schwartz0University of RichmondWidespread deflationistic readings of Quine misrepresent his view of disquotation’s significance and the truth predicate’s utility. I demonstrate this by answering a question that philosophers have not directly addressed: how does Quine understand the philosophical problem of truth? A primary thesis of this paper is that we can answer this question only by working from within Quine’s naturalistic framework. Drawing on neglected texts from Quine's corpus, I defend the view that, for Quine, the problem of truth emerges from the development of science, in particular, from logical theorizing. I show that disquotation itself, from this Quinean point of view, is the problematic phenomenon calling for philosophical reflection. I conclude by arguing that Quine does not envisage the kind of explanatory role for disquotation taken up by contemporary deflationists, and he shows no interest in the task that animates deflationism, namely, to show that concerns with truth’s nature are fundamentally confused.https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/2359 |
| spellingShingle | Joshua Schwartz Quine and the Problem of Truth Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy |
| title | Quine and the Problem of Truth |
| title_full | Quine and the Problem of Truth |
| title_fullStr | Quine and the Problem of Truth |
| title_full_unstemmed | Quine and the Problem of Truth |
| title_short | Quine and the Problem of Truth |
| title_sort | quine and the problem of truth |
| url | https://jhaponline.org/jhap/article/view/2359 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT joshuaschwartz quineandtheproblemoftruth |