Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China

Environmental protection is a basic public service that the government must guarantee and is closely related to public health. An important driver of environmental pollution in China is the local government’s pursuit of a rapid economic development while ignoring environmental protection under the C...

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Main Authors: Hongying Cai, Zefeng Tong, Shulin Xu, Shuoqi Chen, Peng Zhu, Wenjie Liu
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Frontiers Media S.A. 2022-05-01
Series:Frontiers in Environmental Science
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.901079/full
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author Hongying Cai
Zefeng Tong
Shulin Xu
Shuoqi Chen
Peng Zhu
Wenjie Liu
author_facet Hongying Cai
Zefeng Tong
Shulin Xu
Shuoqi Chen
Peng Zhu
Wenjie Liu
author_sort Hongying Cai
collection DOAJ
description Environmental protection is a basic public service that the government must guarantee and is closely related to public health. An important driver of environmental pollution in China is the local government’s pursuit of a rapid economic development while ignoring environmental protection under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system. On the basis of the principal–agent theory between the central and local governments, this study analyzes the environmental deterioration caused by the distortion of local government behavior under fiscal decentralization. In addition, using China’s prefecture-level city data from 2014 to 2018, this study empirically estimates the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution. SO2 emissions and PM2.5 concentrations are used to measure the degree of environmental pollution. Results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization exacerbates environmental pollution and that the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution differs in regions with varying levels of economic development and cultural penetration. Moreover, fiscal decentralization does not significantly impact environmental pollution in eastern China and in those areas influenced by Confucian culture yet aggravates the environmental pollution in central and western China and in those areas that are not affected by Confucian culture. These results offer important policy implications. Clearly dividing the power and financial power between the central and local governments, establishing an environmental governance system compatible with economic incentives, and building an environmental public finance system can alleviate the impact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution.
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spelling doaj.art-f0a265a0f8be4ea3974ce52131413c832022-12-22T00:40:35ZengFrontiers Media S.A.Frontiers in Environmental Science2296-665X2022-05-011010.3389/fenvs.2022.901079901079Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From ChinaHongying Cai0Zefeng Tong1Shulin Xu2Shuoqi Chen3Peng Zhu4Wenjie Liu5School of Finance and Public Administration, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan, ChinaSchool of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, ChinaSchool of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou, ChinaSchool of Finance, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, ChinaBusiness School, Wuhan Qingchuan University, Wuhan, ChinaBusiness School, Jiangsu Open University, Nanjing, ChinaEnvironmental protection is a basic public service that the government must guarantee and is closely related to public health. An important driver of environmental pollution in China is the local government’s pursuit of a rapid economic development while ignoring environmental protection under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system. On the basis of the principal–agent theory between the central and local governments, this study analyzes the environmental deterioration caused by the distortion of local government behavior under fiscal decentralization. In addition, using China’s prefecture-level city data from 2014 to 2018, this study empirically estimates the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution. SO2 emissions and PM2.5 concentrations are used to measure the degree of environmental pollution. Results show that Chinese-style fiscal decentralization exacerbates environmental pollution and that the impact of fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution differs in regions with varying levels of economic development and cultural penetration. Moreover, fiscal decentralization does not significantly impact environmental pollution in eastern China and in those areas influenced by Confucian culture yet aggravates the environmental pollution in central and western China and in those areas that are not affected by Confucian culture. These results offer important policy implications. Clearly dividing the power and financial power between the central and local governments, establishing an environmental governance system compatible with economic incentives, and building an environmental public finance system can alleviate the impact of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization on environmental pollution.https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.901079/fullfiscal decentralizationenvironmental pollutiongovernment behaviorpublic healthconfucian cultureChina
spellingShingle Hongying Cai
Zefeng Tong
Shulin Xu
Shuoqi Chen
Peng Zhu
Wenjie Liu
Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China
Frontiers in Environmental Science
fiscal decentralization
environmental pollution
government behavior
public health
confucian culture
China
title Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China
title_full Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China
title_fullStr Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China
title_full_unstemmed Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China
title_short Fiscal Decentralization, Government Behavior, and Environmental Pollution: Evidence From China
title_sort fiscal decentralization government behavior and environmental pollution evidence from china
topic fiscal decentralization
environmental pollution
government behavior
public health
confucian culture
China
url https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fenvs.2022.901079/full
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AT shulinxu fiscaldecentralizationgovernmentbehaviorandenvironmentalpollutionevidencefromchina
AT shuoqichen fiscaldecentralizationgovernmentbehaviorandenvironmentalpollutionevidencefromchina
AT pengzhu fiscaldecentralizationgovernmentbehaviorandenvironmentalpollutionevidencefromchina
AT wenjieliu fiscaldecentralizationgovernmentbehaviorandenvironmentalpollutionevidencefromchina