Constitutive justice and human rights
In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally understood normativity as present in social reality, we will f...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, Belgrade
2019-01-01
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| Series: | Filozofija i Društvo |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0353-5738/2019/0353-57381904478J.pdf |
| Summary: | In order to show the validity of here proposed conception of social ontology
and its advantages over descriptive theories of social reality, which in the
analysis of the socio-ontological status of human rights find only legally
understood normativity as present in social reality, we will first (1) lay
out Searle’s interpretation of human rights. In the second step, we will (2)
introduce the methodical approach and basic concepts of our
socio-ontological position, and explain the structure of the relationship
between justice, law, morality, social institutions and collective
intentionality. At the end (3) we will show how our theory of social
ontology is better than Searle’s legal positivism in examining the
ontological status of human rights. At the end, (3) we show in what ways
such a theory of social ontology more intuitively and with wider arguments
explains the ontological status of institution of human rights than Searle’s
legal positivism. [Project of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Grant no. 179049: Politics of Social Memory and National Identity: Regional and European Context] |
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| ISSN: | 0353-5738 2334-8577 |