Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions.
Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction...
Main Authors: | Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, György Szabó |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2010-04-01
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Series: | PLoS Computational Biology |
Online Access: | https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/pmid/20454464/pdf/?tool=EBI |
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