A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos
We intend to put into question two fundamental principles adopted by critical rationalism. One of them, explicitly proposed by Popper, argues that what is valid in logic is also in psychology. And the other, tacitly espoused, implies that epistemological verdicts have metascientific authority and va...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
2013-08-01
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| Series: | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/32304 |
| _version_ | 1828369795692625920 |
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| author | Alberto Oliva |
| author_facet | Alberto Oliva |
| author_sort | Alberto Oliva |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We intend to put into question two fundamental principles adopted by critical rationalism. One of them, explicitly proposed by Popper, argues that what is valid in logic is also in psychology. And the other, tacitly espoused, implies that epistemological verdicts have metascientific authority and validity. Regarding the second, we hold the view that to the conclusions arrived at by epistemology should not automatically be conferred metascientific authority and validity. To acquire metascientific import such conclusions also need to be derived from the observation of the actual ways of producing scientific knowledge. The Hume-dependent manner with which Popper rejects induction exemplifies with emblematic strength the tendency to extend the conclusions of epistemology to philosophy of science. On one hand Popper endorses Hume’s argument about the lack of epistemic justification for induction, on the other, disagrees with the humean view that induction is routinely employed and should, therefore, be seen as a human or animal fact. Popper departs from Hume to argue that induction is not even a way of thinking; therefore, it can be employed neither by the layman nor by the scientist. Also in defense of the thesis that induction does not exist, Popper gives primacy to epistemology. More than an epistemological thesis, the theory that decrees that induction is not even a psychological fact requires empirical confirmation. For Popper being right, it is necessary to verify the theory that our minds always operate according to the model from the top down. And psychology not even provides the corroboration of Popper’s thesis. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-14T06:29:21Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f3316f4181b84ded8f24e8e83315418a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1414-4247 1808-1711 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-14T06:29:21Z |
| publishDate | 2013-08-01 |
| publisher | Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology |
| spelling | doaj.art-f3316f4181b84ded8f24e8e83315418a2022-12-22T02:07:41ZengUniversidade Federal de Santa CatarinaPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology1414-42471808-17112013-08-0117227530010.5007/1808-1711.2013v17n2p27521355A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos EpistemológicosAlberto Oliva0Departamento de Filosofia da UFRJWe intend to put into question two fundamental principles adopted by critical rationalism. One of them, explicitly proposed by Popper, argues that what is valid in logic is also in psychology. And the other, tacitly espoused, implies that epistemological verdicts have metascientific authority and validity. Regarding the second, we hold the view that to the conclusions arrived at by epistemology should not automatically be conferred metascientific authority and validity. To acquire metascientific import such conclusions also need to be derived from the observation of the actual ways of producing scientific knowledge. The Hume-dependent manner with which Popper rejects induction exemplifies with emblematic strength the tendency to extend the conclusions of epistemology to philosophy of science. On one hand Popper endorses Hume’s argument about the lack of epistemic justification for induction, on the other, disagrees with the humean view that induction is routinely employed and should, therefore, be seen as a human or animal fact. Popper departs from Hume to argue that induction is not even a way of thinking; therefore, it can be employed neither by the layman nor by the scientist. Also in defense of the thesis that induction does not exist, Popper gives primacy to epistemology. More than an epistemological thesis, the theory that decrees that induction is not even a psychological fact requires empirical confirmation. For Popper being right, it is necessary to verify the theory that our minds always operate according to the model from the top down. And psychology not even provides the corroboration of Popper’s thesis.https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/32304Induçãojustificação epistêmicaimperativo epistemológicofato psicológico. |
| spellingShingle | Alberto Oliva A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology Indução justificação epistêmica imperativo epistemológico fato psicológico. |
| title | A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos |
| title_full | A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos |
| title_fullStr | A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos |
| title_short | A Questionável Atribuição de Autoridade Metacientífica aos Veredictos Epistemológicos |
| title_sort | questionavel atribuicao de autoridade metacientifica aos veredictos epistemologicos |
| topic | Indução justificação epistêmica imperativo epistemológico fato psicológico. |
| url | https://periodicos.ufsc.br/index.php/principia/article/view/32304 |
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