Emergence and Downward Causation Reconsidered in Terms of the Aristotelian-Thomistic View of Causation and Divine Action

<p>One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causa...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mariusz Tabaczek
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika 2016-04-01
Series:Scientia et Fides
Subjects:
Online Access:https://apcz.umk.pl/czasopisma/index.php/SetF/article/view/9429
Description
Summary:<p>One of the main challenges of the nonreductionist approach to complex structures and phenomena in philosophy of biology is its defense of the plausibility of the theory of emergence and downward causation. The tension between remaining faithful to the rules of physicalism and physical causal closure, while defending the novelty and distinctiveness of emergents from their basal constituents, makes the argumentation of many proponents of emergentism lacking in coherency and precision. In this article I aim at answering the suggestion of several thinkers to redefine emergence and downward causation in terms of the broader Aristotelian view of causation. In addition, I further develop this interdisciplinary conversation to include theological implications of emergentism, analyzed in reference to Aquinas’ understanding of divine action in terms of the same fourfold division of causes—bringing thus natural science, philosophy, and theology into creative and fruitful dialogue.</p>
ISSN:2300-7648
2353-5636