The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations
An insurance policy may not only affect the consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. In six experiments we find that people recommend milder punishments for perpetrators when the victim was insured, although people believe that a sentence should not depend on the victim’s insurance status...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2013-03-01
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| Series: | Judgment and Decision Making |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005088/type/journal_article |
| _version_ | 1827830582436954112 |
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| author | Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde Gideon Keren Marcel Zeelenberg |
| author_facet | Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde Gideon Keren Marcel Zeelenberg |
| author_sort | Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | An insurance policy may not only affect the consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. In six experiments we find that people recommend milder punishments for perpetrators when the victim was insured, although people believe that a sentence should not depend on the victim’s insurance status. The robustness of this effect is demonstrated by showing that recommendations can even be more lenient for crimes that are in fact more serious but in which the victim was insured. Moreover, even when harm was possible but did not materialize, people still prefer to punish crimes less severely when the (potential) victim was insured. The final two experiments suggest that the effect is associated with a change in (1) compassion for the victim and (2) perceived severity of the transgression. Implications of this phenomenon are briefly discussed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:31:22Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f446c792e0f044f694f6e24fd78bc574 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1930-2975 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T04:31:22Z |
| publishDate | 2013-03-01 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Judgment and Decision Making |
| spelling | doaj.art-f446c792e0f044f694f6e24fd78bc5742023-09-03T10:05:06ZengCambridge University PressJudgment and Decision Making1930-29752013-03-01816117310.1017/S1930297500005088The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendationsPhilippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde0Gideon Keren1Marcel Zeelenberg2TIBER (Tilburg Institute for Behavioral Economics Research) and Department of Social Psychology, Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000-LE Tilburg, The NetherlandsTilburg UniversityTilburg UniversityAn insurance policy may not only affect the consequences for victims but also for perpetrators. In six experiments we find that people recommend milder punishments for perpetrators when the victim was insured, although people believe that a sentence should not depend on the victim’s insurance status. The robustness of this effect is demonstrated by showing that recommendations can even be more lenient for crimes that are in fact more serious but in which the victim was insured. Moreover, even when harm was possible but did not materialize, people still prefer to punish crimes less severely when the (potential) victim was insured. The final two experiments suggest that the effect is associated with a change in (1) compassion for the victim and (2) perceived severity of the transgression. Implications of this phenomenon are briefly discussed.https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005088/type/journal_articleinsured victim effectpunishmentinsuranceinterpersonal judgment |
| spellingShingle | Philippe P. F. M. van de Calseyde Gideon Keren Marcel Zeelenberg The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations Judgment and Decision Making insured victim effect punishment insurance interpersonal judgment |
| title | The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations |
| title_full | The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations |
| title_fullStr | The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations |
| title_full_unstemmed | The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations |
| title_short | The insured victim effect: When and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations |
| title_sort | insured victim effect when and why compensating harm decreases punishment recommendations |
| topic | insured victim effect punishment insurance interpersonal judgment |
| url | https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1930297500005088/type/journal_article |
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