Default beliefs on colors: the methodological value of what we believe to know about colors
In this article I provide some reasons to justify why the preferable ontological account about colors is that which respects the highest number of beliefs contained in the so-called default position, keeping in mind the relative weight of each one of them. The full system of associated beliefs about...
Main Author: | Ekai Txapartegi |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Rosenberg & Sellier
2010-03-01
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Series: | Rivista di Estetica |
Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/estetica/1811 |
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