An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs
In the circumstance that unexpected events lead to the information asymmetry of sales costs, supplier risk aversion and stochastic price, this paper discusses the internal law of using an emergency quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain. First, the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR)...
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| Format: | Article |
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MDPI AG
2022-03-01
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| Series: | Mathematics |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/10/6/919 |
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| author | Donghong Huang Jinhui Pang Lang Liu Shuangsheng Wu Taisheng Huang |
| author_facet | Donghong Huang Jinhui Pang Lang Liu Shuangsheng Wu Taisheng Huang |
| author_sort | Donghong Huang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In the circumstance that unexpected events lead to the information asymmetry of sales costs, supplier risk aversion and stochastic price, this paper discusses the internal law of using an emergency quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain. First, the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) model of supplier risk aversion under the condition of information symmetry is constructed. In addition, the model is extended to the game model of the CVaR of supplier risk aversion under the condition of the asymmetric information of sales costs and solved. After that, the simulation test is performed. The results show that, firstly, under the condition of random price, the supplier risk aversion leads to the phenomenon of bifurcation and mutation in each decision variable of the supply chain system. Secondly, retailers can obtain excess profits by concealing private information, but this harms the interests of suppliers and the entire supply chain. Thirdly, suppliers with different risk attitudes should have different strategies concerning asymmetry in sales cost information. Fourthly, the more asymmetric the information for the sales costs, the more unstable the system. The conclusion is that the phenomenon of bifurcation mutation is the result of the coupling effect of price randomness and supplier risk aversion. The supply chain cannot coordinate in the bifurcation mutation region, but can coordinate outside of it. Hiding private information benefits those who own it, but harms the system as a whole. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T13:26:49Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f44a64fde1b04656bc9c3ec3b097dac2 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2227-7390 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T13:26:49Z |
| publishDate | 2022-03-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Mathematics |
| spelling | doaj.art-f44a64fde1b04656bc9c3ec3b097dac22023-11-30T21:24:03ZengMDPI AGMathematics2227-73902022-03-0110691910.3390/math10060919An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales CostsDonghong Huang0Jinhui Pang1Lang Liu2Shuangsheng Wu3Taisheng Huang4College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, ChinaSchool of Computer Science & Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, ChinaSchool of Economy and Management, East China Jiaotong University, Nanchang 330013, ChinaSchool of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, ChinaSchool of Computer Science & Technology, Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing 100081, ChinaIn the circumstance that unexpected events lead to the information asymmetry of sales costs, supplier risk aversion and stochastic price, this paper discusses the internal law of using an emergency quantity discount contract to coordinate the supply chain. First, the Conditional Value at Risk (CVaR) model of supplier risk aversion under the condition of information symmetry is constructed. In addition, the model is extended to the game model of the CVaR of supplier risk aversion under the condition of the asymmetric information of sales costs and solved. After that, the simulation test is performed. The results show that, firstly, under the condition of random price, the supplier risk aversion leads to the phenomenon of bifurcation and mutation in each decision variable of the supply chain system. Secondly, retailers can obtain excess profits by concealing private information, but this harms the interests of suppliers and the entire supply chain. Thirdly, suppliers with different risk attitudes should have different strategies concerning asymmetry in sales cost information. Fourthly, the more asymmetric the information for the sales costs, the more unstable the system. The conclusion is that the phenomenon of bifurcation mutation is the result of the coupling effect of price randomness and supplier risk aversion. The supply chain cannot coordinate in the bifurcation mutation region, but can coordinate outside of it. Hiding private information benefits those who own it, but harms the system as a whole.https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/10/6/919stochastic pricerisk aversionasymmetric informationbifurcation phenomenaemergency quantity discount contract |
| spellingShingle | Donghong Huang Jinhui Pang Lang Liu Shuangsheng Wu Taisheng Huang An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs Mathematics stochastic price risk aversion asymmetric information bifurcation phenomena emergency quantity discount contract |
| title | An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs |
| title_full | An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs |
| title_fullStr | An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs |
| title_full_unstemmed | An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs |
| title_short | An Emergency Quantity Discount Contract with Supplier Risk Aversion under the Asymmetric Information of Sales Costs |
| title_sort | emergency quantity discount contract with supplier risk aversion under the asymmetric information of sales costs |
| topic | stochastic price risk aversion asymmetric information bifurcation phenomena emergency quantity discount contract |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/10/6/919 |
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