Single object auctions with interdependent values
This paper reviews single object auctions when bidders’ values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Faculty of Economics, Belgrade
2011-01-01
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| Series: | Ekonomski Anali |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0013-3264/2011/0013-32641188125T.pdf |
| _version_ | 1811265228840632320 |
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| author | Trifunović Dejan |
| author_facet | Trifunović Dejan |
| author_sort | Trifunović Dejan |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper reviews single object auctions when bidders’ values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal with reserve prices and entry fees. Furthermore we will examine the conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common value auctions will be considered when all bidders have the same value for the object. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T20:18:47Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f5a17008de0640569c94b5bc150a9440 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0013-3264 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T20:18:47Z |
| publishDate | 2011-01-01 |
| publisher | Faculty of Economics, Belgrade |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Ekonomski Anali |
| spelling | doaj.art-f5a17008de0640569c94b5bc150a94402022-12-22T03:18:03ZengFaculty of Economics, BelgradeEkonomski Anali0013-32642011-01-015618812516910.2298/EKA1188125TSingle object auctions with interdependent valuesTrifunović DejanThis paper reviews single object auctions when bidders’ values of the object are interdependent. We will see how the auction forms could be ranked in terms of expected revenue when signals that bidders have about the value of the object are affiliated. In the discussion that follows we will deal with reserve prices and entry fees. Furthermore we will examine the conditions that have to be met for English auction with asymmetric bidders to allocate the object efficiently. Finally, common value auctions will be considered when all bidders have the same value for the object.http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0013-3264/2011/0013-32641188125T.pdfaffiliationthe linkage principleWinner’s cursecommon value auctionsex-post equilibrium |
| spellingShingle | Trifunović Dejan Single object auctions with interdependent values Ekonomski Anali affiliation the linkage principle Winner’s curse common value auctions ex-post equilibrium |
| title | Single object auctions with interdependent values |
| title_full | Single object auctions with interdependent values |
| title_fullStr | Single object auctions with interdependent values |
| title_full_unstemmed | Single object auctions with interdependent values |
| title_short | Single object auctions with interdependent values |
| title_sort | single object auctions with interdependent values |
| topic | affiliation the linkage principle Winner’s curse common value auctions ex-post equilibrium |
| url | http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/0013-3264/2011/0013-32641188125T.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT trifunovicdejan singleobjectauctionswithinterdependentvalues |