Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers
We address a game theoretical analysis of the leadership structure of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier and a single retailer involving a risky supplier under demand uncertainty. The risky supplier has a risk of unavailability of delivering the product to the retailer. The equilibrium...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers
2018-07-01
|
| Series: | Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jamdsm/12/3/12_2018jamdsm0070/_pdf/-char/en |
| _version_ | 1811296846375550976 |
|---|---|
| author | Takuya TSUBOI Tatsushi NISHI Guoqing ZHANG |
| author_facet | Takuya TSUBOI Tatsushi NISHI Guoqing ZHANG |
| author_sort | Takuya TSUBOI |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We address a game theoretical analysis of the leadership structure of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier and a single retailer involving a risky supplier under demand uncertainty. The risky supplier has a risk of unavailability of delivering the product to the retailer. The equilibrium solutions for different leadership structures are analytically derived. The influence of the probability of risky supplier availability on the optimal leadership structure is investigated. The model is extended to consider a two-echelon supply chain with two risky suppliers. The total profits for each leadership structure are evaluated from the perspective of the entire supply chain. The analytical results show that the leadership structure with the risky supplier as a leader can maximize the total profit. Numerical examples are provided to show the validity of the proposed analysis. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-13T05:55:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f62718d2c7ea4faa843171944a26597a |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1881-3054 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-13T05:55:27Z |
| publishDate | 2018-07-01 |
| publisher | The Japan Society of Mechanical Engineers |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing |
| spelling | doaj.art-f62718d2c7ea4faa843171944a26597a2022-12-22T02:59:39ZengThe Japan Society of Mechanical EngineersJournal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing1881-30542018-07-01123JAMDSM0070JAMDSM007010.1299/jamdsm.2018jamdsm0070jamdsmAnalysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliersTakuya TSUBOI0Tatsushi NISHI1Guoqing ZHANG2Graduate School of Engineering Science Osaka UniversityGraduate School of Engineering Science Osaka UniversityDepartment of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems, University of WindsorWe address a game theoretical analysis of the leadership structure of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier and a single retailer involving a risky supplier under demand uncertainty. The risky supplier has a risk of unavailability of delivering the product to the retailer. The equilibrium solutions for different leadership structures are analytically derived. The influence of the probability of risky supplier availability on the optimal leadership structure is investigated. The model is extended to consider a two-echelon supply chain with two risky suppliers. The total profits for each leadership structure are evaluated from the perspective of the entire supply chain. The analytical results show that the leadership structure with the risky supplier as a leader can maximize the total profit. Numerical examples are provided to show the validity of the proposed analysis.https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jamdsm/12/3/12_2018jamdsm0070/_pdf/-char/ensupply chain managementgame theorynash equilibriumstackelberg equilibriumuncertain delivery |
| spellingShingle | Takuya TSUBOI Tatsushi NISHI Guoqing ZHANG Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers Journal of Advanced Mechanical Design, Systems, and Manufacturing supply chain management game theory nash equilibrium stackelberg equilibrium uncertain delivery |
| title | Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers |
| title_full | Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers |
| title_fullStr | Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers |
| title_full_unstemmed | Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers |
| title_short | Analysis of leadership structures for two-echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers |
| title_sort | analysis of leadership structures for two echelon supply chains involving multiple risky suppliers |
| topic | supply chain management game theory nash equilibrium stackelberg equilibrium uncertain delivery |
| url | https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jamdsm/12/3/12_2018jamdsm0070/_pdf/-char/en |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT takuyatsuboi analysisofleadershipstructuresfortwoechelonsupplychainsinvolvingmultipleriskysuppliers AT tatsushinishi analysisofleadershipstructuresfortwoechelonsupplychainsinvolvingmultipleriskysuppliers AT guoqingzhang analysisofleadershipstructuresfortwoechelonsupplychainsinvolvingmultipleriskysuppliers |