Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising

In the mid- and late 1900s Bertrand Russell and Hugh MacColl had a non-discussion about implication and existence, as parts of a dispute over the nature of logic. We are tempted to see this debate in terms of logical monist Russell against logical pluralist MacColl, but I argue that this interpretat...

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Main Author: Ivor Grattan-Guinness
Format: Article
Language:deu
Published: Éditions Kimé 2011-04-01
Series:Philosophia Scientiæ
Online Access:http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/372
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author Ivor Grattan-Guinness
author_facet Ivor Grattan-Guinness
author_sort Ivor Grattan-Guinness
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description In the mid- and late 1900s Bertrand Russell and Hugh MacColl had a non-discussion about implication and existence, as parts of a dispute over the nature of logic. We are tempted to see this debate in terms of logical monist Russell against logical pluralist MacColl, but I argue that this interpretation is inaccurate; each man was a logical monist, but with different allegiances. The transition from monism to pluralism began to occur from the early 1910s onwards, soon after MacColl’s death in 1909; early traces will be found especially in the American philosopher C. I. Lewis, the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer, and the Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz. They form examples of the gradual rise of metalogic.
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spelling doaj.art-f64a8587518d48caad546bede1542e662023-12-06T15:54:19ZdeuÉditions KiméPhilosophia Scientiæ1281-24631775-42832011-04-0115118920310.4000/philosophiascientiae.372Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorisingIvor Grattan-GuinnessIn the mid- and late 1900s Bertrand Russell and Hugh MacColl had a non-discussion about implication and existence, as parts of a dispute over the nature of logic. We are tempted to see this debate in terms of logical monist Russell against logical pluralist MacColl, but I argue that this interpretation is inaccurate; each man was a logical monist, but with different allegiances. The transition from monism to pluralism began to occur from the early 1910s onwards, soon after MacColl’s death in 1909; early traces will be found especially in the American philosopher C. I. Lewis, the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer, and the Polish logician Jan Łukasiewicz. They form examples of the gradual rise of metalogic.http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/372
spellingShingle Ivor Grattan-Guinness
Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
Philosophia Scientiæ
title Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
title_full Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
title_fullStr Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
title_full_unstemmed Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
title_short Was Hugh MacColl a logical pluralist or a logical monist? A case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
title_sort was hugh maccoll a logical pluralist or a logical monist a case study in the slow emergence of metatheorising
url http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/372
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