Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas

Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine playe...

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Main Authors: Shounan Lu, Jianhua Dai
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IOP Publishing 2023-01-01
Series:New Journal of Physics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ad0171
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author Shounan Lu
Jianhua Dai
author_facet Shounan Lu
Jianhua Dai
author_sort Shounan Lu
collection DOAJ
description Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M , and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M . Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.
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spelling doaj.art-f6633da31d9e48a0b0f4dd72d3a9311e2023-10-18T12:00:05ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302023-01-01251010303210.1088/1367-2630/ad0171Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmasShounan Lu0Jianhua Dai1School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications , Beijing 100876, People’s Republic of ChinaBusiness School, China University of Political Science and Law , Beijing 100091, People’s Republic of ChinaStrategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M , and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M . Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ad0171social dilemmaaspirationmemory effectstrategy updating rulesevolutionary game
spellingShingle Shounan Lu
Jianhua Dai
Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
New Journal of Physics
social dilemma
aspiration
memory effect
strategy updating rules
evolutionary game
title Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
title_full Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
title_fullStr Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
title_full_unstemmed Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
title_short Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
title_sort success rate driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
topic social dilemma
aspiration
memory effect
strategy updating rules
evolutionary game
url https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ad0171
work_keys_str_mv AT shounanlu successratedrivenstrategyupdatingenhancescooperationinsocialdilemmas
AT jianhuadai successratedrivenstrategyupdatingenhancescooperationinsocialdilemmas