Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas
Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine playe...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2023-01-01
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Series: | New Journal of Physics |
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Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ad0171 |
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author | Shounan Lu Jianhua Dai |
author_facet | Shounan Lu Jianhua Dai |
author_sort | Shounan Lu |
collection | DOAJ |
description | Strategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M , and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M . Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-11T17:40:17Z |
format | Article |
id | doaj.art-f6633da31d9e48a0b0f4dd72d3a9311e |
institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
issn | 1367-2630 |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-11T17:40:17Z |
publishDate | 2023-01-01 |
publisher | IOP Publishing |
record_format | Article |
series | New Journal of Physics |
spelling | doaj.art-f6633da31d9e48a0b0f4dd72d3a9311e2023-10-18T12:00:05ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302023-01-01251010303210.1088/1367-2630/ad0171Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmasShounan Lu0Jianhua Dai1School of Science, Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications , Beijing 100876, People’s Republic of ChinaBusiness School, China University of Political Science and Law , Beijing 100091, People’s Republic of ChinaStrategy updates play an important role in the evolution of cooperation. In traditional imitation rules, it is assumed that strategic learning is driven by payoff bias. In this study, a modified Fermi rule was proposed, in which payoff and success-rate are synthetically considered to determine players’ strategy updates. It is assumed that individuals have an immediate memory length M , and that success can be measured by using an identical aspiration level a as a benchmark. Success-rate is defined in the frequency that an individual’s payoff equals or exceeds the benchmark a within the memory length M . Numerical simulations conducted by considering the two factors in the strategy update show that cooperation can be facilitated compared to the traditional version. Using the identical aspiration level a as benchmark, the results show that there is a clear phase shift phenomenon in enhancing cooperation. This implies that different b will have an appropriate aspiration interval to achieve optimal cooperation. Moreover, only a moderate immediate memory length can facilitate cooperation. The proposed mechanism is highly robust and can provide valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of cooperation.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ad0171social dilemmaaspirationmemory effectstrategy updating rulesevolutionary game |
spellingShingle | Shounan Lu Jianhua Dai Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas New Journal of Physics social dilemma aspiration memory effect strategy updating rules evolutionary game |
title | Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas |
title_full | Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas |
title_fullStr | Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas |
title_full_unstemmed | Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas |
title_short | Success-rate-driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas |
title_sort | success rate driven strategy updating enhances cooperation in social dilemmas |
topic | social dilemma aspiration memory effect strategy updating rules evolutionary game |
url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/ad0171 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT shounanlu successratedrivenstrategyupdatingenhancescooperationinsocialdilemmas AT jianhuadai successratedrivenstrategyupdatingenhancescooperationinsocialdilemmas |