A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction

Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games (http://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/): one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second...

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Main Authors: Eyal Ert, Ido Erev, Alvin E. Roth
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2011-07-01
Series:Games
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/3/257/
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author Eyal Ert
Ido Erev
Alvin E. Roth
author_facet Eyal Ert
Ido Erev
Alvin E. Roth
author_sort Eyal Ert
collection DOAJ
description Two independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games (http://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/): one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of some baseline models. The best baseline model assumes that each choice is made based on one of several rules. The rules include: rational choice, level-1 reasoning, an attempt to maximize joint payoff, and an attempt to increase fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that the most popular rule is rational choice; it is used in about half the cases. To participate in the competitions, researchers are asked to email the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is 1 December 2011, the results of the competition experiment will not be revealed until that date. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competitions will be invited to write a paper that describes their model.
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spelling doaj.art-f6e10c7b0a614b8abd45417f97f768ec2022-12-22T00:59:54ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362011-07-012325727610.3390/g2030257A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An IntroductionEyal ErtIdo ErevAlvin E. RothTwo independent, but related, choice prediction competitions are organized that focus on behavior in simple two-person extensive form games (http://sites.google.com/site/extformpredcomp/): one focuses on predicting the choices of the first mover and the other on predicting the choices of the second mover. The competitions are based on an estimation experiment and a competition experiment. The two experiments use the same methods and subject pool, and examine games randomly selected from the same distribution. The current introductory paper presents the results of the estimation experiment, and clarifies the descriptive value of some baseline models. The best baseline model assumes that each choice is made based on one of several rules. The rules include: rational choice, level-1 reasoning, an attempt to maximize joint payoff, and an attempt to increase fairness. The probability of using the different rules is assumed to be stable over games. The estimated parameters imply that the most popular rule is rational choice; it is used in about half the cases. To participate in the competitions, researchers are asked to email the organizers models (implemented in computer programs) that read the incentive structure as input, and derive the predicted behavior as an output. The submission deadline is 1 December 2011, the results of the competition experiment will not be revealed until that date. The submitted models will be ranked based on their prediction error. The winners of the competitions will be invited to write a paper that describes their model.http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/3/257/social preferencesfairnessreciprocitysocial welfaretrustaltruism
spellingShingle Eyal Ert
Ido Erev
Alvin E. Roth
A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
Games
social preferences
fairness
reciprocity
social welfare
trust
altruism
title A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
title_full A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
title_fullStr A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
title_full_unstemmed A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
title_short A Choice Prediction Competition for Social Preferences in Simple Extensive Form Games: An Introduction
title_sort choice prediction competition for social preferences in simple extensive form games an introduction
topic social preferences
fairness
reciprocity
social welfare
trust
altruism
url http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/2/3/257/
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