Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies

Green innovation is the inevitable trend in the development of the supply chain, and thus the government adopts subsidy policies for the relevant enterprises to enhance their enthusiasm for green development. In view of the manufacturers’ fairness concerns in the dual-channel green supply chain that...

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Main Authors: Lei Song, Qi Xin, Huilin Chen, Lutao Liao, Zheyi Chen
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: MDPI AG 2023-01-01
Series:Mathematics
Subjects:
Online Access:https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/2/284
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author Lei Song
Qi Xin
Huilin Chen
Lutao Liao
Zheyi Chen
author_facet Lei Song
Qi Xin
Huilin Chen
Lutao Liao
Zheyi Chen
author_sort Lei Song
collection DOAJ
description Green innovation is the inevitable trend in the development of the supply chain, and thus the government adopts subsidy policies for the relevant enterprises to enhance their enthusiasm for green development. In view of the manufacturers’ fairness concerns in the dual-channel green supply chain that is composed of manufacturers and retailers, we propose a novel Stackelberg game model led by retailers and analyze the impact of manufacturers’ fairness concerns on the decision-making of manufacturers and retailers in the dual-channel green supply chain under government subsidies. The results show that only the wholesale price of products, manufacturers’ profits, and retailers’ profits are affected by manufacturer’s fair concerns. When manufacturer has fair concerns, product greenness and profits of supply chain members rise with the increase in government subsidies. The results can offer an effective reference for the dual-channel supply chain members with fairness concerns to make optimal decisions under government subsidies.
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spelling doaj.art-f78aeb89ea954d89a7c7780c960d29a82023-11-30T23:20:02ZengMDPI AGMathematics2227-73902023-01-0111228410.3390/math11020284Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government SubsidiesLei Song0Qi Xin1Huilin Chen2Lutao Liao3Zheyi Chen4College of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, ChinaCollege of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, ChinaCollege of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, ChinaCollege of Economics and Trade, Fujian Jiangxia University, Fuzhou 350108, ChinaCollege of Computer and Data Science, Fuzhou University, Fuzhou 350116, ChinaGreen innovation is the inevitable trend in the development of the supply chain, and thus the government adopts subsidy policies for the relevant enterprises to enhance their enthusiasm for green development. In view of the manufacturers’ fairness concerns in the dual-channel green supply chain that is composed of manufacturers and retailers, we propose a novel Stackelberg game model led by retailers and analyze the impact of manufacturers’ fairness concerns on the decision-making of manufacturers and retailers in the dual-channel green supply chain under government subsidies. The results show that only the wholesale price of products, manufacturers’ profits, and retailers’ profits are affected by manufacturer’s fair concerns. When manufacturer has fair concerns, product greenness and profits of supply chain members rise with the increase in government subsidies. The results can offer an effective reference for the dual-channel supply chain members with fairness concerns to make optimal decisions under government subsidies.https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/2/284government subsidiesdual-channel green supply chainfairness concernsretailer-led
spellingShingle Lei Song
Qi Xin
Huilin Chen
Lutao Liao
Zheyi Chen
Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies
Mathematics
government subsidies
dual-channel green supply chain
fairness concerns
retailer-led
title Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies
title_full Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies
title_fullStr Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies
title_full_unstemmed Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies
title_short Optimal Decision-Making of Retailer-Led Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain with Fairness Concerns under Government Subsidies
title_sort optimal decision making of retailer led dual channel green supply chain with fairness concerns under government subsidies
topic government subsidies
dual-channel green supply chain
fairness concerns
retailer-led
url https://www.mdpi.com/2227-7390/11/2/284
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AT qixin optimaldecisionmakingofretailerleddualchannelgreensupplychainwithfairnessconcernsundergovernmentsubsidies
AT huilinchen optimaldecisionmakingofretailerleddualchannelgreensupplychainwithfairnessconcernsundergovernmentsubsidies
AT lutaoliao optimaldecisionmakingofretailerleddualchannelgreensupplychainwithfairnessconcernsundergovernmentsubsidies
AT zheyichen optimaldecisionmakingofretailerleddualchannelgreensupplychainwithfairnessconcernsundergovernmentsubsidies