A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous

Lady Mary Shepherd holds that the relation of cause and effect consists of the combination of two objects (the causes) to create a third object (the effect). She also holds that this account implies that causes are synchronous with their effects. There is a single instant in which the objects that a...

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Main Author: David Landy
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Aperio 2020-01-01
Series:Journal of Modern Philosophy
Subjects:
Online Access:https://jmphil.org/articles/46
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author David Landy
author_facet David Landy
author_sort David Landy
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description Lady Mary Shepherd holds that the relation of cause and effect consists of the combination of two objects (the causes) to create a third object (the effect). She also holds that this account implies that causes are synchronous with their effects. There is a single instant in which the objects that are causes combine to create the object which is their effect. Hume argues that cause and effect cannot be synchronous because if they were then the entire chain of successive causes and effects would all collapse into a single moment, and succession would not be possible. I argue that Shepherd has a ready, although implicit response, to Hume’s argument. Since causation is combination on Shepherd’s view, she is free to hold that there are times in between those instants in which combinations occur, during which times other, non-combinatory changes (such as changes in the location of objects) occur, which changes account for succession.
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spelling doaj.art-f821cd2f6cf045779003de93ae455f222022-12-22T01:41:54ZengAperioJournal of Modern Philosophy2644-06522020-01-012110.32881/jomp.4613A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as SynchronousDavid Landy0San Francisco State UniversityLady Mary Shepherd holds that the relation of cause and effect consists of the combination of two objects (the causes) to create a third object (the effect). She also holds that this account implies that causes are synchronous with their effects. There is a single instant in which the objects that are causes combine to create the object which is their effect. Hume argues that cause and effect cannot be synchronous because if they were then the entire chain of successive causes and effects would all collapse into a single moment, and succession would not be possible. I argue that Shepherd has a ready, although implicit response, to Hume’s argument. Since causation is combination on Shepherd’s view, she is free to hold that there are times in between those instants in which combinations occur, during which times other, non-combinatory changes (such as changes in the location of objects) occur, which changes account for succession.https://jmphil.org/articles/46shepherdhumecausationsimultaneity
spellingShingle David Landy
A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous
Journal of Modern Philosophy
shepherd
hume
causation
simultaneity
title A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous
title_full A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous
title_fullStr A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous
title_full_unstemmed A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous
title_short A Defense of Shepherd’s Account of Cause and Effect as Synchronous
title_sort defense of shepherd s account of cause and effect as synchronous
topic shepherd
hume
causation
simultaneity
url https://jmphil.org/articles/46
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