Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?

This article applies a comparative design to test the explanatory power of formal quantitative models of civil war. It examines the grievance, horizontal inequalities, and institutional models of civil war through the case study of the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009. The aim is to highlight...

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Main Author: Júlia Palik
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Corvinus University of Budapest 2019-05-01
Series:Köz-gazdaság
Online Access:http://retp.eu/index.php/retp/article/view/91
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author Júlia Palik
author_facet Júlia Palik
author_sort Júlia Palik
collection DOAJ
description This article applies a comparative design to test the explanatory power of formal quantitative models of civil war. It examines the grievance, horizontal inequalities, and institutional models of civil war through the case study of the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009. The aim is to highlight political processes that culminate in civil war, and to account for omitted variables in theories of civil war. In the Yemeni case these variables were the competitive rebel market and tribalism. The article shows that civil wars are not isolated events, but parts of a cycle of violence. By accounting for micro-level motives the causal processes that lead to civil wars can be better understood.
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spelling doaj.art-f86b5cc1d6224c26a0bc08f707251f6e2024-08-02T08:09:33ZengCorvinus University of BudapestKöz-gazdaság1788-06962019-05-01141Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?Júlia Palik This article applies a comparative design to test the explanatory power of formal quantitative models of civil war. It examines the grievance, horizontal inequalities, and institutional models of civil war through the case study of the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009. The aim is to highlight political processes that culminate in civil war, and to account for omitted variables in theories of civil war. In the Yemeni case these variables were the competitive rebel market and tribalism. The article shows that civil wars are not isolated events, but parts of a cycle of violence. By accounting for micro-level motives the causal processes that lead to civil wars can be better understood. http://retp.eu/index.php/retp/article/view/91
spellingShingle Júlia Palik
Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?
Köz-gazdaság
title Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?
title_full Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?
title_fullStr Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?
title_full_unstemmed Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?
title_short Civil war theory testing: How greed, horizontal inequalities, and institutions explain the Yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009?
title_sort civil war theory testing how greed horizontal inequalities and institutions explain the yemeni civil war between 2004 and 2009
url http://retp.eu/index.php/retp/article/view/91
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