Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the commonly used standard methods for encrypting and signing messages which is especially applicable to resource-constrained devices such as sensor nodes that are networked in the Internet of Things. The same holds true for wearable sensors. In these fiel...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2022-04-01
|
| Series: | Sensors |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/22/8/3083 |
| _version_ | 1797434261428502528 |
|---|---|
| author | Ievgen Kabin Zoya Dyka Peter Langendoerfer |
| author_facet | Ievgen Kabin Zoya Dyka Peter Langendoerfer |
| author_sort | Ievgen Kabin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the commonly used standard methods for encrypting and signing messages which is especially applicable to resource-constrained devices such as sensor nodes that are networked in the Internet of Things. The same holds true for wearable sensors. In these fields of application, confidentiality and data integrity are of utmost importance as human lives depend on them. In this paper, we discuss the resistance of our fast dual-field ECDSA accelerator against side-channel analysis attacks. We present our implementation of a design supporting four different NIST elliptic curves to allow the reader to understand the discussion of the resistance aspects. For two different target platforms—ASIC and FPGA—we show that the application of atomic patterns, which is considered to ensure resistance against simple side-channel analysis attacks in the literature, is not sufficient to prevent either simple SCA or horizontal address-bit DPA attacks. We also evaluated an approach which is based on the activity of the field multiplier to increase the inherent resistance of the design against attacks performed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T10:29:41Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f874bc876183485da3b5d600b8f42b15 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1424-8220 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T10:29:41Z |
| publishDate | 2022-04-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Sensors |
| spelling | doaj.art-f874bc876183485da3b5d600b8f42b152023-12-01T21:23:52ZengMDPI AGSensors1424-82202022-04-01228308310.3390/s22083083Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace AttacksIevgen Kabin0Zoya Dyka1Peter Langendoerfer2IHP—Leibniz-Institut für Innovative Mikroelektronik, 15236 Frankfurt, GermanyIHP—Leibniz-Institut für Innovative Mikroelektronik, 15236 Frankfurt, GermanyIHP—Leibniz-Institut für Innovative Mikroelektronik, 15236 Frankfurt, GermanyElliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is one of the commonly used standard methods for encrypting and signing messages which is especially applicable to resource-constrained devices such as sensor nodes that are networked in the Internet of Things. The same holds true for wearable sensors. In these fields of application, confidentiality and data integrity are of utmost importance as human lives depend on them. In this paper, we discuss the resistance of our fast dual-field ECDSA accelerator against side-channel analysis attacks. We present our implementation of a design supporting four different NIST elliptic curves to allow the reader to understand the discussion of the resistance aspects. For two different target platforms—ASIC and FPGA—we show that the application of atomic patterns, which is considered to ensure resistance against simple side-channel analysis attacks in the literature, is not sufficient to prevent either simple SCA or horizontal address-bit DPA attacks. We also evaluated an approach which is based on the activity of the field multiplier to increase the inherent resistance of the design against attacks performed.https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/22/8/3083elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)Montgomery <i>kP</i>atomic patternsB-curvesP-curvesside-channel analysis (SCA) attacks |
| spellingShingle | Ievgen Kabin Zoya Dyka Peter Langendoerfer Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks Sensors elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) Montgomery <i>kP</i> atomic patterns B-curves P-curves side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks |
| title | Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks |
| title_full | Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks |
| title_fullStr | Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks |
| title_full_unstemmed | Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks |
| title_short | Atomicity and Regularity Principles Do Not Ensure Full Resistance of ECC Designs against Single-Trace Attacks |
| title_sort | atomicity and regularity principles do not ensure full resistance of ecc designs against single trace attacks |
| topic | elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) Montgomery <i>kP</i> atomic patterns B-curves P-curves side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/1424-8220/22/8/3083 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ievgenkabin atomicityandregularityprinciplesdonotensurefullresistanceofeccdesignsagainstsingletraceattacks AT zoyadyka atomicityandregularityprinciplesdonotensurefullresistanceofeccdesignsagainstsingletraceattacks AT peterlangendoerfer atomicityandregularityprinciplesdonotensurefullresistanceofeccdesignsagainstsingletraceattacks |