The rationality of prejudices.
We model an N-player repeated prisoner's dilemma in which players are given traits (e.g., height, age, wealth) which, we assume, affect their behavior. The relationship between traits and behavior is unknown to other players. We then analyze the performance of "prejudiced" strategies-...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Public Library of Science (PLoS)
2012-01-01
|
| Series: | PLoS ONE |
| Online Access: | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3281029?pdf=render |
| _version_ | 1828766435975888896 |
|---|---|
| author | Thomas Chadefaux Dirk Helbing |
| author_facet | Thomas Chadefaux Dirk Helbing |
| author_sort | Thomas Chadefaux |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We model an N-player repeated prisoner's dilemma in which players are given traits (e.g., height, age, wealth) which, we assume, affect their behavior. The relationship between traits and behavior is unknown to other players. We then analyze the performance of "prejudiced" strategies--strategies that draw inferences based on the observation of some or all of these traits, and extrapolate the inferred behavior to other carriers of these traits. Such prejudiced strategies have the advantage of learning rapidly, and hence of being well adapted to rapidly changing conditions that might result, for example, from high migration or birth rates. We find that they perform remarkably well, and even systematically outperform both Tit-For-Tat and ALLD when the population changes rapidly. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-11T07:05:59Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f900eb8bdf82430abafaee3504deecd4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1932-6203 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-11T07:05:59Z |
| publishDate | 2012-01-01 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science (PLoS) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | PLoS ONE |
| spelling | doaj.art-f900eb8bdf82430abafaee3504deecd42022-12-22T01:16:30ZengPublic Library of Science (PLoS)PLoS ONE1932-62032012-01-0172e3090210.1371/journal.pone.0030902The rationality of prejudices.Thomas ChadefauxDirk HelbingWe model an N-player repeated prisoner's dilemma in which players are given traits (e.g., height, age, wealth) which, we assume, affect their behavior. The relationship between traits and behavior is unknown to other players. We then analyze the performance of "prejudiced" strategies--strategies that draw inferences based on the observation of some or all of these traits, and extrapolate the inferred behavior to other carriers of these traits. Such prejudiced strategies have the advantage of learning rapidly, and hence of being well adapted to rapidly changing conditions that might result, for example, from high migration or birth rates. We find that they perform remarkably well, and even systematically outperform both Tit-For-Tat and ALLD when the population changes rapidly.http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3281029?pdf=render |
| spellingShingle | Thomas Chadefaux Dirk Helbing The rationality of prejudices. PLoS ONE |
| title | The rationality of prejudices. |
| title_full | The rationality of prejudices. |
| title_fullStr | The rationality of prejudices. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The rationality of prejudices. |
| title_short | The rationality of prejudices. |
| title_sort | rationality of prejudices |
| url | http://europepmc.org/articles/PMC3281029?pdf=render |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT thomaschadefaux therationalityofprejudices AT dirkhelbing therationalityofprejudices AT thomaschadefaux rationalityofprejudices AT dirkhelbing rationalityofprejudices |