Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market

The asymptotically stable equilibrium points of asymmetric evolutionary games for multiple groups with multiple game strategies are obtained. The evolution of four groups and more multiple groups in open electricity market are described by the replicator dynamics. Multiple game strategies of the pow...

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Main Authors: Linfei Yin, Shengyuan Li, Fang Gao
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: IEEE 2020-01-01
Series:IEEE Access
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8986555/
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author Linfei Yin
Shengyuan Li
Fang Gao
author_facet Linfei Yin
Shengyuan Li
Fang Gao
author_sort Linfei Yin
collection DOAJ
description The asymptotically stable equilibrium points of asymmetric evolutionary games for multiple groups with multiple game strategies are obtained. The evolution of four groups and more multiple groups in open electricity market are described by the replicator dynamics. Multiple game strategies of the power generation enterprises in open electricity market are studied. Besides, the corresponding asymptotic stability conditions are given by the Lyapunov stability criterion.
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spelling doaj.art-f90d951638554a5f84dc73b16d6a75f92022-12-21T20:19:31ZengIEEEIEEE Access2169-35362020-01-018289702897810.1109/ACCESS.2020.29723878986555Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity MarketLinfei Yin0https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8343-3669Shengyuan Li1Fang Gao2College of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning, ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning, ChinaCollege of Electrical Engineering, Guangxi University, Nanning, ChinaThe asymptotically stable equilibrium points of asymmetric evolutionary games for multiple groups with multiple game strategies are obtained. The evolution of four groups and more multiple groups in open electricity market are described by the replicator dynamics. Multiple game strategies of the power generation enterprises in open electricity market are studied. Besides, the corresponding asymptotic stability conditions are given by the Lyapunov stability criterion.https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8986555/Asymptotically stableevolutionary game theorymultiple game strategiesopen electricity market
spellingShingle Linfei Yin
Shengyuan Li
Fang Gao
Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
IEEE Access
Asymptotically stable
evolutionary game theory
multiple game strategies
open electricity market
title Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
title_full Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
title_fullStr Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
title_full_unstemmed Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
title_short Equilibrium Stability of Asymmetric Evolutionary Games of Multi-Agent Systems With Multiple Groups in Open Electricity Market
title_sort equilibrium stability of asymmetric evolutionary games of multi agent systems with multiple groups in open electricity market
topic Asymptotically stable
evolutionary game theory
multiple game strategies
open electricity market
url https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8986555/
work_keys_str_mv AT linfeiyin equilibriumstabilityofasymmetricevolutionarygamesofmultiagentsystemswithmultiplegroupsinopenelectricitymarket
AT shengyuanli equilibriumstabilityofasymmetricevolutionarygamesofmultiagentsystemswithmultiplegroupsinopenelectricitymarket
AT fanggao equilibriumstabilityofasymmetricevolutionarygamesofmultiagentsystemswithmultiplegroupsinopenelectricitymarket