The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns

<p><strong>Purpose: </strong>The purpose of this paper is, to examine the optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two competing chains with customer returns in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, and to investigate in what cases the manufacturer can make more profits from cus...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Jian Liu, Haiyan Wang
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: OmniaScience 2013-03-01
Series:Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
Subjects:
Online Access:http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/601
_version_ 1819070435842588672
author Jian Liu
Haiyan Wang
author_facet Jian Liu
Haiyan Wang
author_sort Jian Liu
collection DOAJ
description <p><strong>Purpose: </strong>The purpose of this paper is, to examine the optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two competing chains with customer returns in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, and to investigate in what cases the manufacturer can make more profits from customer returns policy.</p><p><strong>Design/methodology/approach:</strong> We build the customer returns model in the competing chains and compare the equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game with that in Stackelberg game.</p><p><strong>Findings:</strong> The main contribution of the present study is the manufacturer can benefit from customer returns policy, only if customer return rate is sufficiently low in two games. In addition, the optimal price, order quantity and profits in Stackelberg game are affected more seriously by customer returns than that in Bertrand-Nash game.</p><p><strong>Originality/value: </strong>The impact of customer returns on the competing chain is initially considered, where the demand is related with the retail price and return price.</p>
first_indexed 2024-12-21T17:05:54Z
format Article
id doaj.art-f972edb939e54e01b8465494d65a0524
institution Directory Open Access Journal
issn 2013-8423
2013-0953
language English
last_indexed 2024-12-21T17:05:54Z
publishDate 2013-03-01
publisher OmniaScience
record_format Article
series Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
spelling doaj.art-f972edb939e54e01b8465494d65a05242022-12-21T18:56:32ZengOmniaScienceJournal of Industrial Engineering and Management2013-84232013-09532013-03-016114916210.3926/jiem.601156The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returnsJian Liu0Haiyan Wang1Southeast UniversitySoutheast University<p><strong>Purpose: </strong>The purpose of this paper is, to examine the optimal pricing and ordering strategy of two competing chains with customer returns in Bertrand-Nash game and Stackelberg game, and to investigate in what cases the manufacturer can make more profits from customer returns policy.</p><p><strong>Design/methodology/approach:</strong> We build the customer returns model in the competing chains and compare the equilibrium results in Bertrand-Nash game with that in Stackelberg game.</p><p><strong>Findings:</strong> The main contribution of the present study is the manufacturer can benefit from customer returns policy, only if customer return rate is sufficiently low in two games. In addition, the optimal price, order quantity and profits in Stackelberg game are affected more seriously by customer returns than that in Bertrand-Nash game.</p><p><strong>Originality/value: </strong>The impact of customer returns on the competing chain is initially considered, where the demand is related with the retail price and return price.</p>http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/601competing supply chain, consumer returns, Bertrand-Nash game, Stackelberg game
spellingShingle Jian Liu
Haiyan Wang
The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management
competing supply chain, consumer returns, Bertrand-Nash game, Stackelberg game
title The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
title_full The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
title_fullStr The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
title_full_unstemmed The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
title_short The equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
title_sort equilibrium results analysis in a competing supply chains with consumer returns
topic competing supply chain, consumer returns, Bertrand-Nash game, Stackelberg game
url http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/601
work_keys_str_mv AT jianliu theequilibriumresultsanalysisinacompetingsupplychainswithconsumerreturns
AT haiyanwang theequilibriumresultsanalysisinacompetingsupplychainswithconsumerreturns
AT jianliu equilibriumresultsanalysisinacompetingsupplychainswithconsumerreturns
AT haiyanwang equilibriumresultsanalysisinacompetingsupplychainswithconsumerreturns