Dialogue sur le vrai
Pascal Engel makes an overall distinction between two tendencies to conceive of the concept of truth. Some defend a substantialist theory according to which truth expresses a “real characteristic” while others maintain that truth is a deflationary rather than an authentic property of truth bearers....
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | deu |
| Published: |
Éditions Kimé
2017-10-01
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| Series: | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| Online Access: | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1301 |
| _version_ | 1797402647303553024 |
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| author | Gerhard Heinzmann |
| author_facet | Gerhard Heinzmann |
| author_sort | Gerhard Heinzmann |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Pascal Engel makes an overall distinction between two tendencies to conceive of the concept of truth. Some defend a substantialist theory according to which truth expresses a “real characteristic” while others maintain that truth is a deflationary rather than an authentic property of truth bearers. Taking realism as a default option, Engel argues for a stable median position which states that truth is a more substantial concept than deflationism claims and less substantial than realistic theories say it is. In this article we develop an alternative median solution to the position proposed by Engel. It is based on an anti-realistic and pragmatic (but not utilitarian) option. More precisely, we show the extent to which the dialogical conception of truth advanced by Kuno Lorenz is opposed to the theses defended by Engel while pursuing the same goal. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T02:27:14Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-f978d0ae897a4bf6bcef3b72d3c6b744 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1281-2463 1775-4283 |
| language | deu |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T02:27:14Z |
| publishDate | 2017-10-01 |
| publisher | Éditions Kimé |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Philosophia Scientiæ |
| spelling | doaj.art-f978d0ae897a4bf6bcef3b72d3c6b7442023-12-06T15:53:28ZdeuÉditions KiméPhilosophia Scientiæ1281-24631775-42832017-10-01213394710.4000/philosophiascientiae.1301Dialogue sur le vraiGerhard HeinzmannPascal Engel makes an overall distinction between two tendencies to conceive of the concept of truth. Some defend a substantialist theory according to which truth expresses a “real characteristic” while others maintain that truth is a deflationary rather than an authentic property of truth bearers. Taking realism as a default option, Engel argues for a stable median position which states that truth is a more substantial concept than deflationism claims and less substantial than realistic theories say it is. In this article we develop an alternative median solution to the position proposed by Engel. It is based on an anti-realistic and pragmatic (but not utilitarian) option. More precisely, we show the extent to which the dialogical conception of truth advanced by Kuno Lorenz is opposed to the theses defended by Engel while pursuing the same goal.http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1301 |
| spellingShingle | Gerhard Heinzmann Dialogue sur le vrai Philosophia Scientiæ |
| title | Dialogue sur le vrai |
| title_full | Dialogue sur le vrai |
| title_fullStr | Dialogue sur le vrai |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dialogue sur le vrai |
| title_short | Dialogue sur le vrai |
| title_sort | dialogue sur le vrai |
| url | http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/1301 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gerhardheinzmann dialoguesurlevrai |