CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA
In this research, the mixed strategy complete information static game was adopted to explain the effect of mandatory dividend policy on agency cost, and Chinese mandatory dividend policy introduced in 2011was regarded as the institutional background, and whether mandatory dividend policy can reduce...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń
2019-06-01
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| Series: | Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://apcz.umk.pl/CJFA/article/view/20693 |
| _version_ | 1797720949497266176 |
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| author | Qin Hailin Zhang Jingxu |
| author_facet | Qin Hailin Zhang Jingxu |
| author_sort | Qin Hailin |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | In this research, the mixed strategy complete information static game was adopted to explain the effect of mandatory dividend policy on agency cost, and Chinese mandatory dividend policy introduced in 2011was regarded as the institutional background, and whether mandatory dividend policy can reduce the agency cost of listed companies as an accidental impact was studied. Empirical test indicates that mandatory dividend policy significantly inhibits the agency cost of enterprises. Further research finds that the mandatory dividend policy has a better effect on reducing agency costs for the companies listed on the main board and those with normal dividends, while it has no significant effect on restraining agency costs for the companies with micro-dividends and small and medium-sized boards. The study supports the dividend agency cost theory and provides empirical evidence for the regulating departments to improve the follow-up policy of capital market governance. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T09:26:52Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fa337e5de2624353b5b1792d744aa5bc |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2300-1240 2300-3065 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T09:26:52Z |
| publishDate | 2019-06-01 |
| publisher | Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting |
| spelling | doaj.art-fa337e5de2624353b5b1792d744aa5bc2023-09-02T14:11:26ZengNicolaus Copernicus University in ToruńCopernican Journal of Finance & Accounting2300-12402300-30652019-06-0181CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINAQin Hailin0Zhang Jingxu1Tianjin Polytechnic UniversityTianjin Polytechnic UniversityIn this research, the mixed strategy complete information static game was adopted to explain the effect of mandatory dividend policy on agency cost, and Chinese mandatory dividend policy introduced in 2011was regarded as the institutional background, and whether mandatory dividend policy can reduce the agency cost of listed companies as an accidental impact was studied. Empirical test indicates that mandatory dividend policy significantly inhibits the agency cost of enterprises. Further research finds that the mandatory dividend policy has a better effect on reducing agency costs for the companies listed on the main board and those with normal dividends, while it has no significant effect on restraining agency costs for the companies with micro-dividends and small and medium-sized boards. The study supports the dividend agency cost theory and provides empirical evidence for the regulating departments to improve the follow-up policy of capital market governance.https://apcz.umk.pl/CJFA/article/view/20693mandatory dividendagency costdividend policymixed strategy equilibriumdifference-in-difference model |
| spellingShingle | Qin Hailin Zhang Jingxu CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA Copernican Journal of Finance & Accounting mandatory dividend agency cost dividend policy mixed strategy equilibrium difference-in-difference model |
| title | CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA |
| title_full | CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA |
| title_fullStr | CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA |
| title_full_unstemmed | CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA |
| title_short | CAN MANDATORY DIVIDEND POLICY REDUCE THE AGENCY COST OF LISTED COMPANIES? MODEL ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL TEST IN CHINA |
| title_sort | can mandatory dividend policy reduce the agency cost of listed companies model analysis and empirical test in china |
| topic | mandatory dividend agency cost dividend policy mixed strategy equilibrium difference-in-difference model |
| url | https://apcz.umk.pl/CJFA/article/view/20693 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT qinhailin canmandatorydividendpolicyreducetheagencycostoflistedcompaniesmodelanalysisandempiricaltestinchina AT zhangjingxu canmandatorydividendpolicyreducetheagencycostoflistedcompaniesmodelanalysisandempiricaltestinchina |