| Summary: | This study proposes an integrated model for the deployment of multiagent resources for resisting outside threats. The proposed two-stage model applies the divide-and-conquer strategy to solve the resources allocation problem. First, the interactive actions between an external attack and a response agent are modeled as a non-cooperative game, after which the external threat value is derived from the Nash equilibrium. Second, the threat values of all response agents are utilized to compute each agent’s Shapley value. Then an acceptable resource allocation of agents based on their expected marginal contribution creates a minimum set of resource deployment costs. The experimental results show that our approach is feasible as a means to mobilize search and rescue resources from a non-affected district and to improve relief efforts against earthquake damage. The Shapley value allocation approach proposed in this study; the percentage of resources allocation of districts is closer to death rate of each district than the proportional division of resources.
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