| Summary: | This paper systematically investigates the conflicting figures of Mind and Geist : Mind has to be understood as some part of nature likely to become the object of science, while Geist names the unmaterial unseizable protagonist of thought. Further, the opposition of the two figures is studied in the light of the way mathematics interfere with it, in several contexts. This leads to following analyses : how computational and dynamicist models of Mind compete within cognitive science; how Geist may be defined philosophically and epistemologically ; how Mind and Geist differently come to be considered or to be aimed at within contemporary cognitive research ; how mathematics and logic play an ambivalent part with respect to the Mind/Geist opposition. In the final section of the paper, a personal definition of the Geist–in terms of address and subject–is proposed, which also leads to some conceptual determination of the Mind. Coming back to the interference with mathematics on this new basis, the paper concludes by an examination of the difficult question of the parametrization of consciousness.
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