A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns
A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficie...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Korea Development Institute
2016-05-01
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| Series: | KDI Journal of Economic Policy |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87 |
| _version_ | 1811253343218040832 |
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| author | HWANG, SUN JOO |
| author_facet | HWANG, SUN JOO |
| author_sort | HWANG, SUN JOO |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | A person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T16:49:28Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fb222286258047b5b0cbc90d81861ff3 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2586-2995 2586-4130 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T16:49:28Z |
| publishDate | 2016-05-01 |
| publisher | Korea Development Institute |
| record_format | Article |
| series | KDI Journal of Economic Policy |
| spelling | doaj.art-fb222286258047b5b0cbc90d81861ff32022-12-22T03:24:27ZengKorea Development InstituteKDI Journal of Economic Policy2586-29952586-41302016-05-013828710110.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career ConcernsHWANG, SUN JOO0Fellow, Korea Development InstituteA person’s life consists of two important stages: the first stage as a student and the second stage as a worker. In an integrated model of education and career concerns, I analyze the welfare effects of education. In Spence’s job market signaling model, education as a sorting device improves efficiency by mitigating the lemon market problem. In contrast, in the integrated model, education as a sorting device can be detrimental to social welfare, as it eliminates work incentives generated by career concerns.https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87educationsignalingcareer concerns |
| spellingShingle | HWANG, SUN JOO A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns KDI Journal of Economic Policy education signaling career concerns |
| title | A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns |
| title_full | A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns |
| title_fullStr | A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns |
| title_short | A Signaling Theory of Education under the Presence of Career Concerns |
| title_sort | signaling theory of education under the presence of career concerns |
| topic | education signaling career concerns |
| url | https://doi.org/10.23895/kdijep.2016.38.2.87 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT hwangsunjoo asignalingtheoryofeducationunderthepresenceofcareerconcerns AT hwangsunjoo signalingtheoryofeducationunderthepresenceofcareerconcerns |