Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia
We investigate relation between board structure (size and composition) and bank performance in 18 Serbian commercial banks with a dominant shareholder in 2006-2010. We analyze this relation using OLS regression analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset of 75 observations. We find no significant relati...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Economics institute, Belgrade
2012-01-01
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| Series: | Industrija |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0350-0373/2012/0350-03731202051S.pdf |
| _version_ | 1818675455035703296 |
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| author | Stančić Predrag Čupić Milan Barjaktarović-Rakočević Slađana Benković Slađana |
| author_facet | Stančić Predrag Čupić Milan Barjaktarović-Rakočević Slađana Benković Slađana |
| author_sort | Stančić Predrag |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | We investigate relation between board structure (size and composition) and bank performance in 18 Serbian commercial banks with a dominant shareholder in 2006-2010. We analyze this relation using OLS regression analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset of 75 observations. We find no significant relation between proportion of independent directors on the board and bank performance. We also find no significant relation between bank market performance and board size. We find that bank profitability, measured by ROA and ROE, increase as the number of directors on the board decreases. This result is statistically significant after controlling for endogenous variables and unobserved macroeconomic effects. We conclude that Serbian banks with dominant shareholder should put limits on board size. The relation between bank performance and ownership concentration ratio is always negative, but significant only in case of ROA and ROE. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-17T08:27:51Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fbbd6501bfeb4b6587fbbdd462d7afe7 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 0350-0373 2334-8526 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-17T08:27:51Z |
| publishDate | 2012-01-01 |
| publisher | Economics institute, Belgrade |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Industrija |
| spelling | doaj.art-fbbd6501bfeb4b6587fbbdd462d7afe72022-12-21T21:56:41ZengEconomics institute, BelgradeIndustrija0350-03732334-85262012-01-0140251680350-03731202051SDominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from SerbiaStančić Predrag0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3095-3983Čupić Milan1https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0150-6682Barjaktarović-Rakočević Slađana2Benković Slađana3https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8798-916XFaculty of Economics, Kragujevac, SerbiaFaculty of Economics, Kragujevac, SerbiaFaculty of Organizational Sciences, Belgrade, SerbiaFaculty of Organizational Sciences, Belgrade, SerbiaWe investigate relation between board structure (size and composition) and bank performance in 18 Serbian commercial banks with a dominant shareholder in 2006-2010. We analyze this relation using OLS regression analysis on an unbalanced panel dataset of 75 observations. We find no significant relation between proportion of independent directors on the board and bank performance. We also find no significant relation between bank market performance and board size. We find that bank profitability, measured by ROA and ROE, increase as the number of directors on the board decreases. This result is statistically significant after controlling for endogenous variables and unobserved macroeconomic effects. We conclude that Serbian banks with dominant shareholder should put limits on board size. The relation between bank performance and ownership concentration ratio is always negative, but significant only in case of ROA and ROE.https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0350-0373/2012/0350-03731202051S.pdfbank performanceboard structurecommercial banksdominant shareholder |
| spellingShingle | Stančić Predrag Čupić Milan Barjaktarović-Rakočević Slađana Benković Slađana Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia Industrija bank performance board structure commercial banks dominant shareholder |
| title | Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia |
| title_full | Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia |
| title_fullStr | Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia |
| title_short | Dominant shareholders, board structure and bank performance: Evidence from Serbia |
| title_sort | dominant shareholders board structure and bank performance evidence from serbia |
| topic | bank performance board structure commercial banks dominant shareholder |
| url | https://scindeks-clanci.ceon.rs/data/pdf/0350-0373/2012/0350-03731202051S.pdf |
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