THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE

In a context of relativization the division between creation and application of the law, the article aims to analyze, under the analytical and conceptual perspective of philosophy, the problem of the degree of interpretative freedom, the (in) determination of law, the existence or not of correct ans...

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Main Author: Loiane Prado Verbicaro
Format: Article
Language:Portuguese
Published: Universidade Federal de Santa Maria 2018-05-01
Series:Revista Eletrônica do Curso de Direito da UFSM
Subjects:
Online Access:https://periodicos.ufsm.br/revistadireito/article/view/28192
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author Loiane Prado Verbicaro
author_facet Loiane Prado Verbicaro
author_sort Loiane Prado Verbicaro
collection DOAJ
description In a context of relativization the division between creation and application of the law, the article aims to analyze, under the analytical and conceptual perspective of philosophy, the problem of the degree of interpretative freedom, the (in) determination of law, the existence or not of correct answer and the need for judicial discretion in the strong or weak sense, from the study of the truth of legal propositions conditions and discussions about the possibility of objectively true interpretative judgments through realism and semantic anti-realism. The bibliographical research of qualitative approach focuses on the analysis of Hartian positivism and the interpretativism of Ronald Dworkin. Contrary to Dworkin's theory that even in difficult cases legal propositions present a truth value, research is aligned with Hartian thinking, which considers that the existence of difficult cases leads to the indeterminacy of law and to the idea that certain propositions lack the value of truth.
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spelling doaj.art-fbf0116f2bc54d7ab0560cb46dc813b02022-12-22T02:41:28ZporUniversidade Federal de Santa MariaRevista Eletrônica do Curso de Direito da UFSM1981-36941981-36942018-05-0113113315810.5902/198136942819214712THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATELoiane Prado Verbicaro0Centro Universitário do ParáIn a context of relativization the division between creation and application of the law, the article aims to analyze, under the analytical and conceptual perspective of philosophy, the problem of the degree of interpretative freedom, the (in) determination of law, the existence or not of correct answer and the need for judicial discretion in the strong or weak sense, from the study of the truth of legal propositions conditions and discussions about the possibility of objectively true interpretative judgments through realism and semantic anti-realism. The bibliographical research of qualitative approach focuses on the analysis of Hartian positivism and the interpretativism of Ronald Dworkin. Contrary to Dworkin's theory that even in difficult cases legal propositions present a truth value, research is aligned with Hartian thinking, which considers that the existence of difficult cases leads to the indeterminacy of law and to the idea that certain propositions lack the value of truth.https://periodicos.ufsm.br/revistadireito/article/view/28192condições de verdade, discricionariedadeinterpretativismopositivismoresposta correta.
spellingShingle Loiane Prado Verbicaro
THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE
Revista Eletrônica do Curso de Direito da UFSM
condições de verdade, discricionariedade
interpretativismo
positivismo
resposta correta.
title THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE
title_full THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE
title_fullStr THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE
title_full_unstemmed THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE
title_short THE JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE TRUTH CONDITIONS OF LEGAL PRPOSITIONS UNDER THE HART AND DWORKIN’S DEBATE
title_sort judicial discretion and the truth conditions of legal prpositions under the hart and dworkin s debate
topic condições de verdade, discricionariedade
interpretativismo
positivismo
resposta correta.
url https://periodicos.ufsm.br/revistadireito/article/view/28192
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