<i>Simple</i> Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game
In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a <i>simple</i> mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the <i>N</i> possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests o...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
MDPI AG
2023-06-01
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| Series: | Games |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/14/3/47 |
| Summary: | In the Crawford–Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a <i>simple</i> mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the <i>N</i> possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the <i>N</i> actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such <i>simple</i> mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated <i>N</i>-partition Crawford–Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small. |
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| ISSN: | 2073-4336 |