Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents
This paper presents an analysis of the effects of cognitive agents employing selfish routing behavior in traffic networks with linear latency functions. Selfish routing occurs when each agent traveling on a network acts in a purely selfish manner, therefore the Braess Paradox is likely to occur. The...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2018-08-01
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| Series: | ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information |
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| Online Access: | http://www.mdpi.com/2220-9964/7/9/345 |
| _version_ | 1811204957805740032 |
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| author | Johannes Scholz Richard L. Church |
| author_facet | Johannes Scholz Richard L. Church |
| author_sort | Johannes Scholz |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | This paper presents an analysis of the effects of cognitive agents employing selfish routing behavior in traffic networks with linear latency functions. Selfish routing occurs when each agent traveling on a network acts in a purely selfish manner, therefore the Braess Paradox is likely to occur. The Braess Paradox describes a situation where an additional edge with positive capacity is added to a given network, which leads to higher total system delay. By applying the concept of cognitive agents, each agent is able to make a range of non-selfish and selfish decisions. In addition, each agent has to cope with uncertainty in terms of travel time information associated with the traffic system, a factor in real-world traffic networks. This paper evaluates the influence of travel time uncertainty, and possible non-selfish decisions of the agents on overall network delay. The results indicate that both non-selfish behavior and uncertainty have an influence on overall travel delay. In addition, understanding the influence of cognitive agents on delay can help to better plan and influence traffic flows resulting in “closer to optimal” flows involving overall lower delays. |
| first_indexed | 2024-04-12T03:22:27Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fc9613ac39b74c0bbf194521fb76a1c4 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2220-9964 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-04-12T03:22:27Z |
| publishDate | 2018-08-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information |
| spelling | doaj.art-fc9613ac39b74c0bbf194521fb76a1c42022-12-22T03:49:52ZengMDPI AGISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information2220-99642018-08-017934510.3390/ijgi7090345ijgi7090345Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive AgentsJohannes Scholz0Richard L. Church1Research Group Geoinformation, Institute of Geodesy, Graz University of Technology, A-8010 Graz, AustriaDepartment of Geography, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106, USAThis paper presents an analysis of the effects of cognitive agents employing selfish routing behavior in traffic networks with linear latency functions. Selfish routing occurs when each agent traveling on a network acts in a purely selfish manner, therefore the Braess Paradox is likely to occur. The Braess Paradox describes a situation where an additional edge with positive capacity is added to a given network, which leads to higher total system delay. By applying the concept of cognitive agents, each agent is able to make a range of non-selfish and selfish decisions. In addition, each agent has to cope with uncertainty in terms of travel time information associated with the traffic system, a factor in real-world traffic networks. This paper evaluates the influence of travel time uncertainty, and possible non-selfish decisions of the agents on overall network delay. The results indicate that both non-selfish behavior and uncertainty have an influence on overall travel delay. In addition, understanding the influence of cognitive agents on delay can help to better plan and influence traffic flows resulting in “closer to optimal” flows involving overall lower delays.http://www.mdpi.com/2220-9964/7/9/345Braess Paradoxagent-based simulationcognitive agents |
| spellingShingle | Johannes Scholz Richard L. Church Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information Braess Paradox agent-based simulation cognitive agents |
| title | Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents |
| title_full | Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents |
| title_fullStr | Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents |
| title_full_unstemmed | Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents |
| title_short | Shortest Paths from a Group Perspective—A Note on Selfish Routing Games with Cognitive Agents |
| title_sort | shortest paths from a group perspective a note on selfish routing games with cognitive agents |
| topic | Braess Paradox agent-based simulation cognitive agents |
| url | http://www.mdpi.com/2220-9964/7/9/345 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT johannesscholz shortestpathsfromagroupperspectiveanoteonselfishroutinggameswithcognitiveagents AT richardlchurch shortestpathsfromagroupperspectiveanoteonselfishroutinggameswithcognitiveagents |