Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources
Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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IOP Publishing
2018-01-01
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| Series: | New Journal of Physics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/aad839 |
| _version_ | 1797750726125944832 |
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| author | Weilong Wang Kiyoshi Tamaki Marcos Curty |
| author_facet | Weilong Wang Kiyoshi Tamaki Marcos Curty |
| author_sort | Weilong Wang |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Security proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill this gap by providing a finite-key security analysis for QKD which is valid against arbitrary information leakage from the state preparation process of the legitimate users. For this, we extend the techniques introduced by Tamaki et al (2016 New J. Phys. 18 065008) to the finite-key regime, and we evaluate the security of a leaky decoy-state BB84 protocol with biased basis choice, which is one of the most implemented QKD schemes today. Our simulation results demonstrate the practicability of QKD over long distances and within a reasonable time frame given that the legitimate users’ devices are sufficiently isolated. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:37:03Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fcca0a4833314826b0c46457f1d1dd75 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1367-2630 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-12T16:37:03Z |
| publishDate | 2018-01-01 |
| publisher | IOP Publishing |
| record_format | Article |
| series | New Journal of Physics |
| spelling | doaj.art-fcca0a4833314826b0c46457f1d1dd752023-08-08T14:51:28ZengIOP PublishingNew Journal of Physics1367-26302018-01-0120808302710.1088/1367-2630/aad839Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sourcesWeilong Wang0Kiyoshi Tamaki1Marcos Curty2EI Telecomunicación, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo , Vigo E-36310, SpainGraduate School of Science and Engineering for Research, University of Toyama , Gofuku 3190, Toyama 930-8555, JapanEI Telecomunicación, Department of Signal Theory and Communications, University of Vigo , Vigo E-36310, SpainSecurity proofs of quantum key distribution (QKD) typically assume that the devices of the legitimate users are perfectly shielded from the eavesdropper. This assumption is, however, very hard to meet in practice, and thus the security of current QKD implementations is not guaranteed. Here, we fill this gap by providing a finite-key security analysis for QKD which is valid against arbitrary information leakage from the state preparation process of the legitimate users. For this, we extend the techniques introduced by Tamaki et al (2016 New J. Phys. 18 065008) to the finite-key regime, and we evaluate the security of a leaky decoy-state BB84 protocol with biased basis choice, which is one of the most implemented QKD schemes today. Our simulation results demonstrate the practicability of QKD over long distances and within a reasonable time frame given that the legitimate users’ devices are sufficiently isolated.https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/aad839decoy-state QKDinformation leakagefinite-key security |
| spellingShingle | Weilong Wang Kiyoshi Tamaki Marcos Curty Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources New Journal of Physics decoy-state QKD information leakage finite-key security |
| title | Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources |
| title_full | Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources |
| title_fullStr | Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources |
| title_full_unstemmed | Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources |
| title_short | Finite-key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources |
| title_sort | finite key security analysis for quantum key distribution with leaky sources |
| topic | decoy-state QKD information leakage finite-key security |
| url | https://doi.org/10.1088/1367-2630/aad839 |
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