Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism
The development of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’ thought on Avicennian and post-Avicennian representationalism and conceptualism is marked by increasing skepticism and critical engagement. Avicenna’s representationalism posits that knowledge is relies on mental forms whose quiddities are identical to those...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Scientific Studies Association (ILEM)
2023-11-01
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| Series: | Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences |
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| Online Access: | https://nazariyat.org/content/5-sayilar/19-cilt-9-sayi-2/3-francesco-omar-zamboni-te/3_f_o_zamboni_en.pdf |
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| author | Francesco Omar Zamboni |
| author_facet | Francesco Omar Zamboni |
| author_sort | Francesco Omar Zamboni |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | The development of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’ thought on Avicennian and post-Avicennian representationalism and conceptualism is marked by increasing skepticism and critical engagement. Avicenna’s representationalism posits that knowledge is relies on mental forms whose quiddities are identical to those of the objects of knowledge. Some post-Avicennians reformulate this account by viewing mental forms as different from the objects in quiddity (i.e., as mere images). Al-Rāzī is critical of both Avicennian representationalism and representationalism simpliciter. He rejects two foundational premises of Avicennian representationalism—that mental existence is different from concrete existence, that pure quiddity is existentially indifferent—based on the non-equivocity of existence, as well as Avicennian representationalism itself, because it would lead to the impossibility of knowing the extra-mental concomitants of quiddities. Against representationalism simpliciter, al-Rāzī contends that one of its premises—knowledge necessarily requires a specific non-relative accident inhering in the knower—is insufficiently justified, as well as demonstrably false based on his doctrine that knowledge is a pure relation. Avicenna’s conceptualism concerns three classes of things, i.e., non-existent objects of knowledge, definitional parts of simple quiddities, and secondary intelligibles (logical properties). Post-Avicennian conceptualists go beyond the Shaykh, expanding the third class to include properties like existence, unity, thingness, modalities, relations in general. Al-Rāzī’s attack against conceptualism about non-existent objects of knowledge criticizes both the general premise that existence is extensionally unlimited and the specific premise that imaginative objects have extra-mentally non-existent quiddities. Al-Rāzī also elaborates arguments against conceptualism in general, based on correspondence and on the removal of the mind. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:01:41Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fcda1fdac7c440ae8f885955436f6b58 |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2547-9415 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-08T22:01:41Z |
| publishDate | 2023-11-01 |
| publisher | Scientific Studies Association (ILEM) |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences |
| spelling | doaj.art-fcda1fdac7c440ae8f885955436f6b582023-12-19T13:13:04ZengScientific Studies Association (ILEM)Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences2547-94152023-11-01926911210.12658/Nazariyat.9.2.M0212enWeak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and ConceptualismFrancesco Omar Zamboni0https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0860-0225 University of JyväskyläThe development of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’ thought on Avicennian and post-Avicennian representationalism and conceptualism is marked by increasing skepticism and critical engagement. Avicenna’s representationalism posits that knowledge is relies on mental forms whose quiddities are identical to those of the objects of knowledge. Some post-Avicennians reformulate this account by viewing mental forms as different from the objects in quiddity (i.e., as mere images). Al-Rāzī is critical of both Avicennian representationalism and representationalism simpliciter. He rejects two foundational premises of Avicennian representationalism—that mental existence is different from concrete existence, that pure quiddity is existentially indifferent—based on the non-equivocity of existence, as well as Avicennian representationalism itself, because it would lead to the impossibility of knowing the extra-mental concomitants of quiddities. Against representationalism simpliciter, al-Rāzī contends that one of its premises—knowledge necessarily requires a specific non-relative accident inhering in the knower—is insufficiently justified, as well as demonstrably false based on his doctrine that knowledge is a pure relation. Avicenna’s conceptualism concerns three classes of things, i.e., non-existent objects of knowledge, definitional parts of simple quiddities, and secondary intelligibles (logical properties). Post-Avicennian conceptualists go beyond the Shaykh, expanding the third class to include properties like existence, unity, thingness, modalities, relations in general. Al-Rāzī’s attack against conceptualism about non-existent objects of knowledge criticizes both the general premise that existence is extensionally unlimited and the specific premise that imaginative objects have extra-mentally non-existent quiddities. Al-Rāzī also elaborates arguments against conceptualism in general, based on correspondence and on the removal of the mind.https://nazariyat.org/content/5-sayilar/19-cilt-9-sayi-2/3-francesco-omar-zamboni-te/3_f_o_zamboni_en.pdfepistemologyconceptualismfakhr al-dīn al-rāzīontologyrepresentationalism |
| spellingShingle | Francesco Omar Zamboni Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism Nazariyat: Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences epistemology conceptualism fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī ontology representationalism |
| title | Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism |
| title_full | Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism |
| title_fullStr | Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism |
| title_short | Weak Discourses on People’s Lips Fakhr al-Dın al-Razı against Representationalism and Conceptualism |
| title_sort | weak discourses on people s lips fakhr al din al razi against representationalism and conceptualism |
| topic | epistemology conceptualism fakhr al-dīn al-rāzī ontology representationalism |
| url | https://nazariyat.org/content/5-sayilar/19-cilt-9-sayi-2/3-francesco-omar-zamboni-te/3_f_o_zamboni_en.pdf |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT francescoomarzamboni weakdiscoursesonpeopleslipsfakhraldınalrazıagainstrepresentationalismandconceptualism |