Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model
Prefabricated housing and cast-in-site housing are two alternatives for selection by developers and customers. The government, as the policy maker, creates incentive policies to encourage developers and customers to choose prefabricated housing. This paper aims to analyze the subsidy mechanism to th...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
2021-10-01
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| Series: | Journal of Civil Engineering and Management |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/15610 |
| _version_ | 1818579262196678656 |
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| author | Kaicheng Shen Xiaodong Li Xinying Cao Zhihui Zhang |
| author_facet | Kaicheng Shen Xiaodong Li Xinying Cao Zhihui Zhang |
| author_sort | Kaicheng Shen |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | Prefabricated housing and cast-in-site housing are two alternatives for selection by developers and customers. The government, as the policy maker, creates incentive policies to encourage developers and customers to choose prefabricated housing. This paper aims to analyze the subsidy mechanism to theoretically confirm the subsidies’ scopes, amounts and end times through an evolutionary game model and simulation. In the game model, government subsidies affect the interactions between developers and customers in the decision-making process. The findings are as follows: 1) The developer housing subsidy can lower the housing price, while the customer housing subsidy can increase the price; 2) The government should first offer the developers a larger subsidy amount during the early development stage and then offer the customers a smaller subsidy amount later; 3) The government should determine the end time based on the proportion of developers and customers who choose prefabricated housing; 4) A higher prefabrication ratio may not always improve the development of prefabricated housing, and there is an optimal production scale that creates the best development situation. The empirical analysis shows that this model can help the government develop reasonable and optimal subsidy policies within the limit of budget to stimulate developers and customers. |
| first_indexed | 2024-12-16T06:58:54Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-fe3704e4cb6140119bb1ecacb7ada86f |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 1392-3730 1822-3605 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-12-16T06:58:54Z |
| publishDate | 2021-10-01 |
| publisher | Vilnius Gediminas Technical University |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Journal of Civil Engineering and Management |
| spelling | doaj.art-fe3704e4cb6140119bb1ecacb7ada86f2022-12-21T22:40:14ZengVilnius Gediminas Technical UniversityJournal of Civil Engineering and Management1392-37301822-36052021-10-0127755357010.3846/jcem.2021.1561015610Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game modelKaicheng Shen0Xiaodong Li1Xinying Cao2Zhihui Zhang3Department of Construction Management, School of Civil Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, ChinaDepartment of Construction Management, School of Civil Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, ChinaDepartment of Construction Management, School of Civil Engineering, Hainan University, Hainan Province, ChinaDepartment of Construction Management, School of Civil Engineering, Tsinghua University, Beijing, ChinaPrefabricated housing and cast-in-site housing are two alternatives for selection by developers and customers. The government, as the policy maker, creates incentive policies to encourage developers and customers to choose prefabricated housing. This paper aims to analyze the subsidy mechanism to theoretically confirm the subsidies’ scopes, amounts and end times through an evolutionary game model and simulation. In the game model, government subsidies affect the interactions between developers and customers in the decision-making process. The findings are as follows: 1) The developer housing subsidy can lower the housing price, while the customer housing subsidy can increase the price; 2) The government should first offer the developers a larger subsidy amount during the early development stage and then offer the customers a smaller subsidy amount later; 3) The government should determine the end time based on the proportion of developers and customers who choose prefabricated housing; 4) A higher prefabrication ratio may not always improve the development of prefabricated housing, and there is an optimal production scale that creates the best development situation. The empirical analysis shows that this model can help the government develop reasonable and optimal subsidy policies within the limit of budget to stimulate developers and customers.https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/15610prefabricated housingsubsidydevelopercustomergovernmentevolutionary game model |
| spellingShingle | Kaicheng Shen Xiaodong Li Xinying Cao Zhihui Zhang Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model Journal of Civil Engineering and Management prefabricated housing subsidy developer customer government evolutionary game model |
| title | Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model |
| title_full | Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model |
| title_fullStr | Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model |
| title_full_unstemmed | Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model |
| title_short | Prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in China based on an evolutionary game model |
| title_sort | prefabricated housing subsidy analysis in china based on an evolutionary game model |
| topic | prefabricated housing subsidy developer customer government evolutionary game model |
| url | https://journals.vgtu.lt/index.php/JCEM/article/view/15610 |
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