Locke on Individuation and Kinds

Locke has been accused of endorsing a theory of kinds that is inconsistent with his theory of individuation. This purported inconsistency comes to the fore in Locke’s treatment of cases involving organisms and the masses of matter that constitute them, for example, the case of a mass constitu...

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Main Author: Joseph Stenberg
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Western Libraries, The University of Western Ontario 2018-02-01
Series:Locke Studies
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/873
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author Joseph Stenberg
author_facet Joseph Stenberg
author_sort Joseph Stenberg
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description Locke has been accused of endorsing a theory of kinds that is inconsistent with his theory of individuation. This purported inconsistency comes to the fore in Locke’s treatment of cases involving organisms and the masses of matter that constitute them, for example, the case of a mass constituting an oak tree. In this essay, I argue that this purported problem, known as ‘The Kinds Problem’, can be solved. The Kinds Problem depends on the faulty assumption that nominal essences include only features observable at a time t. Once this assumption is rejected, new candidates open up for the relevant difference in the world that is included in the nominal essence of e.g. mass but not oak tree. And I argue that there is at least one good candidate for the extrinsic feature observable only over time in which the mass differs from the oak it constitutes, namely its persistence conditions. The Kinds Problem can be solved.
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spelling doaj.art-fe4c9e8eabb44385ae9ae05983c589452022-12-22T17:00:36ZengWestern Libraries, The University of Western OntarioLocke Studies2561-925X2018-02-011710.5206/ls.2017.873Locke on Individuation and KindsJoseph Stenberg0Humboldt-Universitat zu Berlin Locke has been accused of endorsing a theory of kinds that is inconsistent with his theory of individuation. This purported inconsistency comes to the fore in Locke’s treatment of cases involving organisms and the masses of matter that constitute them, for example, the case of a mass constituting an oak tree. In this essay, I argue that this purported problem, known as ‘The Kinds Problem’, can be solved. The Kinds Problem depends on the faulty assumption that nominal essences include only features observable at a time t. Once this assumption is rejected, new candidates open up for the relevant difference in the world that is included in the nominal essence of e.g. mass but not oak tree. And I argue that there is at least one good candidate for the extrinsic feature observable only over time in which the mass differs from the oak it constitutes, namely its persistence conditions. The Kinds Problem can be solved. https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/873John LockeKindsIndividuationLockeKinds ProblemNominal Essence
spellingShingle Joseph Stenberg
Locke on Individuation and Kinds
Locke Studies
John Locke
Kinds
Individuation
Locke
Kinds Problem
Nominal Essence
title Locke on Individuation and Kinds
title_full Locke on Individuation and Kinds
title_fullStr Locke on Individuation and Kinds
title_full_unstemmed Locke on Individuation and Kinds
title_short Locke on Individuation and Kinds
title_sort locke on individuation and kinds
topic John Locke
Kinds
Individuation
Locke
Kinds Problem
Nominal Essence
url https://ojs.lib.uwo.ca/index.php/locke/article/view/873
work_keys_str_mv AT josephstenberg lockeonindividuationandkinds