Endogenous Timing in a Price-Setting Mixed Duopoly with a Foreign Competitor
This paper considers mixed duopoly games where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete in price. The public firm aims to maximize the un-weighted sum of consumer surplus and its own profit. The paper examines a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, an ef...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Mashhad: Behzad Hassannezhad Kashani
2016-12-01
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| Series: | International Journal of Management, Accounting and Economics |
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://www.ijmae.com/article_116570_4bae4b14d8769992313b9b34ccaf1baa.pdf |
| Summary: | This paper considers mixed duopoly games where a state-owned public firm and a foreign private firm compete in price. The public firm aims to maximize the un-weighted sum of consumer surplus and its own profit. The paper examines a desirable role (either leader or follower) of the public firm, an effect of eliminating the foreign firm and an endogenous role in price-setting mixed duopoly by adopting the observable delay game. Consequently, the paper shows that the unique equilibrium of price-setting international mixed competition is quite different from that of quantity-setting international mixed competition. |
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| ISSN: | 2383-2126 |