Communication-Enhancing Vagueness
I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only pre...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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MDPI AG
2022-06-01
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| Series: | Games |
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| Online Access: | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/4/49 |
| _version_ | 1797432202277945344 |
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| author | Daniel H. Wood |
| author_facet | Daniel H. Wood |
| author_sort | Daniel H. Wood |
| collection | DOAJ |
| description | I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only precise messages can be sent. I also develop and structurally estimate a model showing that vague messages increase communication between boundedly rational players, especially if some senders are moderately honest. Moderately honest senders avoid stating an outright lie by using vague messages to hedge them. Then, precise messages are more informative because there are fewer precise lies. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-09T09:56:53Z |
| format | Article |
| id | doaj.art-ff9732512245460998aa808f18a3645e |
| institution | Directory Open Access Journal |
| issn | 2073-4336 |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-09T09:56:53Z |
| publishDate | 2022-06-01 |
| publisher | MDPI AG |
| record_format | Article |
| series | Games |
| spelling | doaj.art-ff9732512245460998aa808f18a3645e2023-12-01T23:43:18ZengMDPI AGGames2073-43362022-06-011344910.3390/g13040049Communication-Enhancing VaguenessDaniel H. Wood0Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, DC 20580, USAI experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only precise messages can be sent. I also develop and structurally estimate a model showing that vague messages increase communication between boundedly rational players, especially if some senders are moderately honest. Moderately honest senders avoid stating an outright lie by using vague messages to hedge them. Then, precise messages are more informative because there are fewer precise lies.https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/4/49deceptioncheap talkexperimentsbounded rationalityvaguenesshonesty |
| spellingShingle | Daniel H. Wood Communication-Enhancing Vagueness Games deception cheap talk experiments bounded rationality vagueness honesty |
| title | Communication-Enhancing Vagueness |
| title_full | Communication-Enhancing Vagueness |
| title_fullStr | Communication-Enhancing Vagueness |
| title_full_unstemmed | Communication-Enhancing Vagueness |
| title_short | Communication-Enhancing Vagueness |
| title_sort | communication enhancing vagueness |
| topic | deception cheap talk experiments bounded rationality vagueness honesty |
| url | https://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/13/4/49 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT danielhwood communicationenhancingvagueness |