Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism
We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant‐strategy, and we prove that all dominant‐strategy mechanisms are...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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The Econometric Society
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100962 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |
| _version_ | 1826217338808041472 |
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| author | Chiesa, Alessandro Micali, Silvio Zhu, Zeyuan Allen |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Chiesa, Alessandro Micali, Silvio Zhu, Zeyuan Allen |
| author_sort | Chiesa, Alessandro |
| collection | MIT |
| description | We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant‐strategy, and we prove that all dominant‐strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:02:04Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/100962 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T17:02:04Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | The Econometric Society |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1009622022-09-29T23:14:12Z Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism Chiesa, Alessandro Micali, Silvio Zhu, Zeyuan Allen Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Chiesa, Alessandro Micali, Silvio Zhu, Zeyuan Allen We analyze the Vickrey mechanism for auctions of multiple identical goods when the players have both Knightian uncertainty over their own valuations and incomplete preferences. In this model, the Vickrey mechanism is no longer dominant‐strategy, and we prove that all dominant‐strategy mechanisms are inadequate. However, we also prove that, in undominated strategies, the social welfare produced by the Vickrey mechanism in the worst case is not only very good, but also essentially optimal. 2016-01-21T00:42:00Z 2016-01-21T00:42:00Z 2015-09 2015-04 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0012-9682 1468-0262 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100962 Chiesa, Alessandro, Silvio Micali, and Zeyuan Allen Zhu. “Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism.” Econometrica 83, no. 5 (2015): 1727–1754. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/ECTA12131 Econometrica Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf The Econometric Society MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Chiesa, Alessandro Micali, Silvio Zhu, Zeyuan Allen Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism |
| title | Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism |
| title_full | Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism |
| title_fullStr | Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism |
| title_short | Knightian Analysis of the Vickrey Mechanism |
| title_sort | knightian analysis of the vickrey mechanism |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/100962 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0816-4064 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT chiesaalessandro knightiananalysisofthevickreymechanism AT micalisilvio knightiananalysisofthevickreymechanism AT zhuzeyuanallen knightiananalysisofthevickreymechanism |