The epistemic significance of experience
According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended.
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer Netherlands
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103433 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3652-1492 |
| Summary: | According to orthodoxy, perceptual beliefs are caused by perceptual experiences. The paper argues that this view makes it impossible to explain how experiences can be epistemically significant. A rival account, on which experiences in the “good case” are ways of knowing, is set out and defended. |
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