Ironing without control
I extend Myersonʼs [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive...
Main Author: | Toikka, Juuso T. |
---|---|
Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
Format: | Article |
Language: | en_US |
Published: |
Elsevier
2016
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/103942 https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0400-5733 |
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