Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games
In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
John Wiley & Sons
2016
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104059 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 |
| _version_ | 1811096848061956096 |
|---|---|
| author | Weinstein, Jonathan Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Weinstein, Jonathan Yildiz, Muhamet |
| author_sort | Weinstein, Jonathan |
| collection | MIT |
| description | In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:49:39Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/104059 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T16:49:39Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | John Wiley & Sons |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1040592022-10-03T08:36:30Z Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games Weinstein, Jonathan Yildiz, Muhamet Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Economics Yildiz, Muhamet In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about the stage payoffs. In particular, any finitely repeated game with commitment types is strategically equivalent to a standard finitely repeated game with incomplete information about the stage payoffs. Then classic reputation results can be achieved with uncertainty concerning only the stage payoffs. 2016-08-29T16:18:47Z 2016-08-29T16:18:47Z 2016-01 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 19336837 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104059 Weinstein, Jonathan, and Muhamet Yildiz. "Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games." Theoretical Economics 11 (2016), 157-185. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/TE1893 Theoretical Economics Creative Commons Attribution Non-Commercial License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ application/pdf John Wiley & Sons Society for Economic Theory |
| spellingShingle | Weinstein, Jonathan Yildiz, Muhamet Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| title | Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| title_full | Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| title_fullStr | Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| title_short | Reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| title_sort | reputation without commitment in finitely repeated games |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104059 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7637-7117 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT weinsteinjonathan reputationwithoutcommitmentinfinitelyrepeatedgames AT yildizmuhamet reputationwithoutcommitmentinfinitelyrepeatedgames |