Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum
Thesis: S.M. in Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Engineering, Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Technology and Policy Program, 2016.
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| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104829 |
| _version_ | 1811080941280428032 |
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| author | Immerman, Eleanor |
| author2 | R. Scott Kemp. |
| author_facet | R. Scott Kemp. Immerman, Eleanor |
| author_sort | Immerman, Eleanor |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Thesis: S.M. in Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Engineering, Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Technology and Policy Program, 2016. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:39:17Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | mit-1721.1/104829 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | eng |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T11:39:17Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1048292019-04-12T16:20:55Z Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum DVNW and the secrecy-certainty spectrum Immerman, Eleanor R. Scott Kemp. Technology and Policy Program. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Engineering Systems Division. Technology and Policy Program. Institute for Data, Systems, and Society. Engineering Systems Division. Technology and Policy Program. Thesis: S.M. in Technology and Policy, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, School of Engineering, Institute for Data, Systems, and Society, Technology and Policy Program, 2016. Cataloged from PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 88-97). Historically, arms control treaties have exclusively relied on indirect verification mechanisms. Increasingly, direct nuclear weapons verification proves relevant to future arms control treaties. I therefore explore the epistemology of direct nuclear weapons verification through interviews, reports, and publications on potential verification systems. I argue that within Russia, most involved in the arms control non-governmental community, consider existing verification technologies sufficient. They are noticeably caught between contradictions in their work on disarmament verification and skeptical that their efforts will influence arms control dynamics. Within direct verification of nuclear weapons (DVNW) experiments, the few vulnerability tests and technology demonstrations that occur tend to disrupt prior assumptions about verification and longstanding research trajectories within the field, triggering epistemic crises within the verification field. Shifting political and technical constraints shape many of the ideas within DVNW. Narratives that frame secrecy and certainty as direct trade-offs appear to have developed in the United States with Field Test 34 and continue to generate an underlying skepticism towards any approaches that attempt to reconcile the aims of direct weapons verification.. by Eleanor Immerman. S.M. in Technology and Policy 2016-10-14T15:54:39Z 2016-10-14T15:54:39Z 2016 2016 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104829 959239642 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 97 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| spellingShingle | Institute for Data, Systems, and Society. Engineering Systems Division. Technology and Policy Program. Immerman, Eleanor Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum |
| title | Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum |
| title_full | Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum |
| title_fullStr | Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum |
| title_full_unstemmed | Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum |
| title_short | Direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy-certainty spectrum |
| title_sort | direct verification of nuclear weapons and the secrecy certainty spectrum |
| topic | Institute for Data, Systems, and Society. Engineering Systems Division. Technology and Policy Program. |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104829 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT immermaneleanor directverificationofnuclearweaponsandthesecrecycertaintyspectrum AT immermaneleanor dvnwandthesecrecycertaintyspectrum |