Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism
Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2013) argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Oxford University Press
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104877 |
| _version_ | 1811094381318373376 |
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| author | Spencer II, John Haven |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Spencer II, John Haven |
| author_sort | Spencer II, John Haven |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2013) argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I articulate an invariantist account of disagreement that is compatible with reversibility. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:59:09Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/104877 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:59:09Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1048772022-10-02T05:32:23Z Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism Spencer II, John Haven Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Spencer II, John Haven Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder (2013) argue that invariantist accounts of disagreement are incompatible with the phenomenon of reversibility. In this essay I develop a non-standard theory of propositional attitudes, which I call attitudinal relativism. Using the resources of attitudinal relativism, I articulate an invariantist account of disagreement that is compatible with reversibility. 2016-10-20T16:36:57Z 2016-10-20T16:36:57Z 2016-04 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0026-4423 1460-2113 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104877 Spencer, Jack. “Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism.” Mind 125.498 (2016): 511–539. en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv150 Mind Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Spencer II, John Haven Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism |
| title | Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism |
| title_full | Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism |
| title_fullStr | Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism |
| title_short | Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism |
| title_sort | disagreement and attitudinal relativism |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104877 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT spenceriijohnhaven disagreementandattitudinalrelativism |