Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?
There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physi...
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| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
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Oxford University Press
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104887 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540 |
| Summary: | There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that (some) physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts. |
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