Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?
There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physi...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | en_US |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press
2016
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104887 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540 |
| _version_ | 1811094009152536576 |
|---|---|
| author | Skow, Bradford |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Skow, Bradford |
| author_sort | Skow, Bradford |
| collection | MIT |
| description | There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that (some) physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:54:05Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/104887 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | en_US |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T15:54:05Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1048872022-09-29T16:55:44Z Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? Skow, Bradford Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy Skow, Bradford There are lots of arguments for, or justifications of, mathematical theorems that make use of principles from physics. Do any of these constitute explanations? On the one hand, physical principles do not seem like they should be explanatorily relevant; on the other, some particular examples of physical justifications do look explanatory. In this article, I defend the idea that (some) physical justifications can and do explain mathematical facts. 2016-10-20T18:49:22Z 2016-10-20T18:49:22Z 2015-03 Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 0007-0882 1464-3537 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104887 Skow, B. “Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66.1 (2015): 69–93. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540 en_US http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axt038 The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ application/pdf Oxford University Press MIT web domain |
| spellingShingle | Skow, Bradford Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? |
| title | Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? |
| title_full | Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? |
| title_fullStr | Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? |
| title_short | Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena? |
| title_sort | are there genuine physical explanations of mathematical phenomena |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/104887 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7892-4540 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT skowbradford aretheregenuinephysicalexplanationsofmathematicalphenomena |