Efficient Money Burning in General Domains

We study mechanism design where the objective is to maximize the residual surplus, i.e., the total value of the outcome minus the payments charged to the agents, by truthful mechanisms. The motivation comes from applications where the payments charged are not in the form of actual monetary transfers...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Fotakis, Dimitris, Tsipras, Dimitris, Tzamos, Christos, Zampetakis, Emmanouil
Other Authors: Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Springer US 2016
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5727-5409
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6809-8268