Efficient Money Burning in General Domains
We study mechanism design where the objective is to maximize the residual surplus, i.e., the total value of the outcome minus the payments charged to the agents, by truthful mechanisms. The motivation comes from applications where the payments charged are not in the form of actual monetary transfers...
Main Authors: | Fotakis, Dimitris, Tsipras, Dimitris, Tzamos, Christos, Zampetakis, Emmanouil |
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Other Authors: | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Springer US
2016
|
Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105350 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5727-5409 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7560-5069 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6809-8268 |
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