Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources
Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. Recently, it has been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Language: | English |
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American Physical Society
2016
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105893 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X |
| _version_ | 1826197258115219456 |
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| author | Lim, Charles Ci Wen Xu, Feihu Siopsis, George Chitambar, Eric Evans, Philip G. Qi, Bing |
| author2 | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics |
| author_facet | Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics Lim, Charles Ci Wen Xu, Feihu Siopsis, George Chitambar, Eric Evans, Philip G. Qi, Bing |
| author_sort | Lim, Charles Ci Wen |
| collection | MIT |
| description | Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. Recently, it has been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication (LOCC) adversaries. Here, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser sources and linear optics. In this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss. |
| first_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:44:56Z |
| format | Article |
| id | mit-1721.1/105893 |
| institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-09-23T10:44:56Z |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publisher | American Physical Society |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | mit-1721.1/1058932022-09-27T14:43:42Z Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources Lim, Charles Ci Wen Xu, Feihu Siopsis, George Chitambar, Eric Evans, Philip G. Qi, Bing Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Research Laboratory of Electronics Xu, Feihu Quantum position verification (QPV) is the art of verifying the geographical location of an untrusted party. Recently, it has been shown that the widely studied Bennett & Brassard 1984 (BB84) QPV protocol is insecure after the 3 dB loss point assuming local operations and classical communication (LOCC) adversaries. Here, we propose a time-reversed entanglement swapping QPV protocol (based on measurement-device-independent quantum cryptography) that is highly robust against quantum channel loss. First, assuming ideal qubit sources, we show that the protocol is secure against LOCC adversaries for any quantum channel loss, thereby overcoming the 3 dB loss limit. Then, we analyze the security of the protocol in a more practical setting involving weak laser sources and linear optics. In this setting, we find that the security only degrades by an additive constant and the protocol is able to verify positions up to 47 dB channel loss. United States. Office of Naval Research United States. Dept. of Energy. Cybersecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (Contract M614000329) Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Laboratory Directed Research and Development Program United States. Dept. of Energy. (UT-Battelle, LLC. Contract DE-AC05-00OR22725) 2016-12-20T18:52:07Z 2016-12-20T18:52:07Z 2016-09 2016-07 2016-09-14T22:00:30Z Article http://purl.org/eprint/type/JournalArticle 2469-9926 2469-9934 http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105893 Lim, Charles Ci Wen et al. “Loss-Tolerant Quantum Secure Positioning with Weak Laser Sources.” Physical Review A 94.3 (2016): n. pag. © 2016 American Physical Society https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X en http://dx.doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevA.94.032315 Physical Review A Article is made available in accordance with the publisher's policy and may be subject to US copyright law. Please refer to the publisher's site for terms of use. American Physical Society application/pdf American Physical Society American Physical Society |
| spellingShingle | Lim, Charles Ci Wen Xu, Feihu Siopsis, George Chitambar, Eric Evans, Philip G. Qi, Bing Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| title | Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| title_full | Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| title_fullStr | Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| title_full_unstemmed | Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| title_short | Loss-tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| title_sort | loss tolerant quantum secure positioning with weak laser sources |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105893 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1643-225X |
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