Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory
Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015.
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Format: | Thesis |
Language: | eng |
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology
2016
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Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105987 |
_version_ | 1811082585121488896 |
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author | González, Julián Armando |
author2 | Howard E. Shrobe. |
author_facet | Howard E. Shrobe. González, Julián Armando |
author_sort | González, Julián Armando |
collection | MIT |
description | Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015. |
first_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:05:44Z |
format | Thesis |
id | mit-1721.1/105987 |
institution | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
language | eng |
last_indexed | 2024-09-23T12:05:44Z |
publishDate | 2016 |
publisher | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | mit-1721.1/1059872019-04-11T08:48:00Z Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory González, Julián Armando Howard E. Shrobe. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2015. This electronic version was submitted by the student author. The certified thesis is available in the Institute Archives and Special Collections. Cataloged from student-submitted PDF version of thesis. Includes bibliographical references (pages 105-111). The rise of code reuse attacks has been devastating for users of languages like C and C++ that lack memory safety. We survey existing defenses to understand why none are generally applicable, focusing our attention on the Code Pointer Integrity (CPI) defense. We show that while CPI is hard to implement securely on modern architectures, it is based on the promising idea of storing metadata on memory. We also introduce Taxi (Tagged C), a set of hardware modifications that aim to prevent code reuse attacks by storing small amounts of memory metadata known as tags in hardware. Our reference implementation prevents several classes of code reuse attacks without losing compatibility with the C memory model and provides valuable insight into how tagged architectures can be used to enforce security properties on existing code. by Julián Armando González. M. Eng. 2016-12-22T15:17:34Z 2016-12-22T15:17:34Z 2015 2015 Thesis http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105987 965795675 eng M.I.T. theses are protected by copyright. They may be viewed from this source for any purpose, but reproduction or distribution in any format is prohibited without written permission. See provided URL for inquiries about permission. http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/7582 111 pages application/pdf Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
spellingShingle | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. González, Julián Armando Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
title | Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
title_full | Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
title_fullStr | Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
title_full_unstemmed | Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
title_short | Taxi : defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
title_sort | taxi defeating code reuse attacks with tagged memory |
topic | Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. |
url | http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/105987 |
work_keys_str_mv | AT gonzalezjulianarmando taxidefeatingcodereuseattackswithtaggedmemory |